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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
As the New Russia proceeds on its post-communist path towards the attainment of
liberal order, Western-style legal institutions increasingly replace their communist
predecessors. The changes made to the Russian legal system during the past decade have
been both fundamental and far-reaching. They include the passage of legislation and
provide a framework for the creation of private legal entities and for the carrying out of
commercial transactions. Institutions commonplace in Western industrialized market
economies have been created, such as commissions dealing with antitrust, bankruptcy and
securities. To be sure, a full listing of the reforms thus undertaken would be prohibitively
long. As these developments continue, the Russian government is taking up the role of
chief reformer pushing the agenda of restructuring by proposing sets of norms premised
on liberal values. However, even though major steps have been undertaken towards the
building of a modem institutional infrastructure, deficiencies in created devices are
pervasive. Indicative is the tendency for Russian entrepreneurs to exercise conspicuous
restraint towards recently legislated concepts. Entrepreneurs cling to defensive business
strategies that circumvent official policy beyond the reach of legal accountability.'
Appropriated strategies range from the revitalization of Soviet trading networks to
straightforward criminal activities. An emerging anti-legal subculture is attested, which
* See, for example, Hendley, Kathryn and Cheryl Gray. 1997. "Developing Commercial Law in
Transition Economies: Examples from Hungary and Russia," in The Rule ofLaw and Economic Reform in
Russia, pp. 139-165.
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supplants official policy with illicit business practice? The formation of shadowy control
structures antithetical to free market institutions calls into question the capacity of the
Russian polity to undergo transformation in the direction of a democratic and law-
governed market economy.
What are the institutional reasons for this type of apparently low transformative
state capacity? The range of possible explication ranges from technical approaches
focusing on the dysfunctional state of law enforcement agencies to more comprehensive
accounts of state-societal relations.^ Within the latter stream of theorizing, a popular
approach is to characterize transitional processes in terms of traditional Russian state
authority.'* In these accounts, deficiencies in outcome optimization have been ascribed to
the autocratic style of politics under President Boris Yeltsin. It is the goal of the present
study to examine the latter suggestion by inquiring into the institutional bases of Russian
reform politics. Accordingly, the question is raised as to what extent the Yeltsin
Presidency did in effect duplicate culturally established patterns of autocratic governance
in the coordination and control of economic reform policy? In addition, the question of
how autocratic-style governance would infringe upon the principled purpose of reform,
namely to design and implement liberal types of economic order is addressed. In this
respect, the present study proceeds along the hypothetical base line that there is in fact a
^ See, for example, Volkov, Vadim. 1999. "Violent Entrepreneurship in Post-Communist Russia,"
Europe-Asia Studies, Vol.51, No.5, pp.74 1-754.
^ See, for example, Brovkin, Vladimir. 1998. "Fragmentation of Authority and Privatization of the
State: From Gorbachev to Yeltsin," Demokratizatsiya, Summer, pp.504-517.
“ See, for example, Shevtsova, Lilia. 1999. Yeltsin's Russia: Myths and Reality. Washington. DC:
Brookings; Fish, M. Steven. 2000. "The Executive Deception: Superpresidentialism and the Degradation of
Russian Politics," in Building the Russian State, pp. 177-192.
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structural correlation between the variables of institutional arrangement and the capacity
to transform embedded social behaviors.
To examine these issues this study engages in a comparative analysis of the two
regimes in question, the Romanov dynasty, on the one hand, and the Yeltsin Presidency,
on the other. To analyze the extent of convergence, the study focuses on institutional
variables governing participation in policy choice. Structural features deemed relevant to
this process extend to both organizational dimensions of government, inter-branch and
interface. In this way specified categories emerge more clearly within the process of
analyzing corporate law reform. As the ensuing discussion will make clear, both periods
encountered in this context substantial obstacles to formulating and conveying a coherent
corporate governance regime upon the sociological field of transformation. The discourse
will begin by discussing the theoretical underpinnings of institutional development.
Utilizing an engineer-like perspective, inquiry is made into the strands of institutional
theory. Particular attention is paid to the issues of participation and interaction in order to
present an ideal-typical model of institutional development on the basis of which the
analysis of the Russian case will be pursued.
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CHAPTER 2
INSTITUTIONS: THE THEORETICAL DISCOURSE
Making an inquiry into the concept of institutions might be best described in
terms of the metaphorical undertaking of opening the "black box." By examining the
pertaining research literature, it becomes obvious that multiple theoretical styles have
been designed to provide answers to the question of what institutions are, what
institutions do, and how they originate and change. So far, it appears that the project of
disclosing the locked up" subject matter is still unfolding since new variables and
theoretical styles surface along the process. Accordingly, much of the academic debate
focuses on the meta-question of which methodological approach might unveil the tectonic
laws of institutions. Neo-traditional or "soft" styles contend in this way with behavioral or
"hard" styles of theorizing.^ The behavioral approach, however, somewhat dominates the
scenery. Neo-traditional approaches are dismissed as "soft story-telling" while behavioral
styles of theorizing, utilizing the methodological basis of rational choice theory, claim to
provide institutional analysis with universal laws. The universahstic ambition of
behavioral styles derives from its distinctive methodological approach that, as such, is
widely considered incompatible with previous modes of inquiry. While "traditional"
studies usually presumed an order based on macro-level processes as culture, history, the
political system, or the like; contending behavioral styles put an emphasis on micro-level
^ For a critical overview, see Green, Donald P. and Ian Shapiro. 1994. Pathologies ofRational
Choice Theory: A Critique of Applications in Political Science. New Haven: Yale University Press;
Rothstein, Bo. 1996. "Political Institutions: An Overview," in A New Handbook of Political Science,
pp.133-166; Taylor, Rosemary C. and Peter A. Hall. 1996. "Political Science and the Three New
Institutionalisms," Political Studies, Vol. XLIV, pp.936-957.
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processes of strategic action. As a result, distinctive and eventually mutually exclusive
aspects of institutional "realities" get specified ranging from descriptive to explanatory
levels of analysis. The academic community, so it seems, has been more successful in
laying out a variety of methodological routes leading to the study of institutional
phenomena, rather than producing an empirically validated outcome. In contemplating the
logic of contending theoretical styles, the question, which approach might deliver the
better key regarding the description, explanation, or even prediction of modem
institutions, is still open.
The following discourse aims to shed some light onto the dominant strands of
institutional analysis. The inquiry differentiates, following the suggestion of Taylor and
Hall,^ into rational-calculative, normative-cultural, and eclectic styles of institutional
analysis. The study concentrates in this respect on the latter theoretical stream that is
commonly referred to as the historical variant of institutional analysis. This theoretical
style will be examined according to its capacity to provide definitions, descriptions of
institutional effects, and explanations of institutional origin and change. Definitions and
schemes of institutional effects, it is noted, often fall into the same category since
institutions are usually defined in terms of their effects on human behavior.
Eclectic Styles
One of the seminal texts striving to bridge interdisciphnary barriers has in this
respect been rendered by Douglass North's (1990) Institutions, Institutional Change, and
Economic Performance, a distinguished student of economic history, which integrates
* Taylor & Hall, 1996.
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culturally conditioned modes of behavior into a framework of rational decision-making.
The reconstruction of this approach will be amended with insights deriving from another
seminal text concerning commercial law institutions, as rendered by Max Weber’s ( 1954 )
Economy and SocietyJ
The starting point of this style of theorizing represents the modification of the
micro-foundations of rational choicethe ry.** This step occurs on the basis of empirical
data provided by cognitive psychology, whereby it is demonstrated that the behavioral
context of strategic action underlies the impact of incomplete knowledge and limited
computational capacities. Strategic actors, contrary to rational choice assumptions, are
described as computing information pertinent to choice incompletely and normatively
biased, instead of reaching decisions instantaneously. Consequently, a gap, labeled "CD
gap" in the technical jargon, is found to penetrate the field of human action, which
discriminates between the competence [C] of the agent in deciphering problems, and the
difficulty [D] in selecting the most preferred alternative.^ The epistemological dilemma
unfolds that the objective situation of choice and its subjective representation in the
’ This study utilizes the annotated and selective version of Max Weber's Economy and Society
edited by Max Rheinstein who focuses on the legal aspects of Weber's text. The title of the edited version
accordingly reads: Max Weber on Law in Economy and Society. 1954. Edited with introduction and
annotations by Max Rheinstein. NY : Simon and Schuster. Rather than list the name of the editor
(Rheinstein), this paper quotes the original author (Weber) in order to simplify the quotation process.
* Rational choice theory pictures human actors as strategic agents who structure their agency
according to the overwhelming imperative of self-interested utility maximization. Utility functions are
defined in terms of individually perceived preferences, which are presumed to be stable, transitive,
exogenous to choice, and egoistic in bias. — Picturing human nature as intrinsically egoistic has sparked off
a flurry of critical literature showing discomfort with these kinds of "reductionist" (Peters, 1996, pp.216f)
assumptions. The specific variations of these critics are, however, beyond the scope of this inquiry. For
further details concerning the debate about the behavioralist assumptions of rational choice theories see D.
Green and Shapiro (1994).
® See Ronald Heiner. 1983. "The Origins of Predictable Behavior," American Economic Review,
Vol.73, pp.560-595, quoted in North 1990, pp.23f.
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decision-maker's mind are not identical. Accordingly, the proposition is made that "we"
have to distinguish between the real world and the decision-maker's perception of it.*®
Culture IS entering the equation by providing a language-based conceptual
framework for encoding and interpreting the information that the senses are presenting to
the brain. By drawing upon evolutionary theories, it is posited that the organization of
knowledge, values and other factors influencing behavior is contingent upon cultural
inheritance. Culture itself is defined as the transmission from one generation to the next,
via teaching and imitation, of knowledge, values, and other factors that influence
behavior."** Within this context, "culture" denotes a multifaceted composite of
procedural and normative concepts that become effective in the framework of
institutional analysis. Procedural concepts include the notion of "cultural processing" and
"social transmission;" whereas "behavioral norms" and "internal codes" describe
normative aspects of "culture."*^
Due to the theoretical challenge posed by the event of CD gaps, the inquiry
focuses on procedural concepts of culture and particularly the concept of "cultural
processing"*^ in order to design an integrative approach towards institutional analysis.
Cultural processing of information signifies the central modus operand! for encoding and
North, 1990, pp.23ff.
R. Boyd and P.J. Richerson. 1985. Culture and the Evolutionary Process. Chicago; University
of Chicago Press, p.2, quoted in North, 1990, p.37.
Normative concepts of culture comprise a composite of culturally embedded "informal rules
and abstract value-sets. Informal rules consist of "modifications" of formal rules, socially sanctioned
"behavioral norms" and internally enforced "codes of conduct" (see definition below in section formal and
informal rules"). As a result, informal rules, like abstract values, constitute an integral part of a society’s
cultural heritage, whereas culture itself does not merely consist of informal rules.
North, 1990, p.44.
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interpreting information in the human brain and thus renders the constitutive momentum
m the creation of mental constructs. Culture endows the individual agent with a language-
based conceptual framework within which to organize, utilize, and process information.
The capacity to communicate with the world and to participate in exchange situation is
related to cultural endowments. The formula of "cultural processing" subsumes the
condition that decision-making proceeds on the basis of subjective mental constructs,
which are subject to culturally derived scripts. Cultural processing of information then
influences the structure of institutional entities since institutions are constructs of the
human mind. In this way, it is concluded, "culture defines the way individuals process
and utilize information and hence may affect the way institutional constraints get
specified."
It is noticed that this perspective on institutional development aligns cultural
styles of institutional analysis by emphasizing procedural aspects of human existence in
the description and explanation of institutional constraints. The common denominator is
that meaning and identity are conditioned by procedural concepts of information. To be
sure, cultural styles of analysis put primacy on the political that manages meanings and
identities through "the symbolism of the decision-making process," whereas North puts
primacy on cultural processing of information. Both approaches, however, utilize
procedural concepts of information to provide contending accounts of the
North, 1990, p.42.
March, James G. and Johan P Olsen. 1984. "The New Institutionalism: Organizational Factors in
Political Life," American Political Science Review, Vol.78, pp.734-749, here at page 49.
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interrelationship of mental constructs, preferences, and institutional constraints. The
cultural pattern of causation, however, is more sympathetic towards the ideals of
individual freedom since it does not consider cultural homogeneity or the technique of
political indoctrination as imperative. On the contrary. North renders a less rigid pattern
of causation by leaving the exact nature of the transmission mechanism that links cultural
macro-level processes with micro-level mental constructs inconclusive. As North
concedes: "We still are a long way from having any neat models of cultural evolution."*^
The inquiry, however, aligns the perspective of rational-calculative styles by
demonstrating that institutions are the product of utihty-maximizing strategies. Strategic
actors, confronting the event of CD gaps, are pictured as designing institutions as a
rational and utility-maximizing strategy in response to both: "the complexity of the
problems to be solved and the problem-solving software (to use a computer analogy)
possessed by the individual. Rules and procedures evolve to simplify the uncertainties
involved in human interaction. Institutions exist to reduce complexity of human
cooperation by limiting the choice sets of the actors. As a result, a way out is managed to
verify the basic behavioral postulate of rational choice theory, namely, that human actors
act in a rational-calculative manner and that institutions are the product of strategic
interaction. Social agents are understood to act strategically because they reahze the need
to devise institutional constraints in order to avoid the costhness of information deriving
from latent existing CD gaps.
** For "some interesting attempts," North (1990) refers to the works of Cavalli-Sforza and
Feldman, 1981; Boyd and Richerson, 1985.
” North, 1990, p.25.
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Formal and informal constraints. Institutions, due to the culture-integrative
approach, are differentiated into patterns of constraints that are "informal" and "formal" in
character. Before getting into details, caution is advised regarding the domain of the
"informal" since, deriving from North's text, the "informal" renders a network of
conceptual linkages that, as such, escape strictly linear-causal modes of thought. As the
following will testify, the "informal" is approached via the concepts of "culture," "mental
constructs, and behavior." It is emphasized that North does not provide a simple
formula for ways to convey these concepts into a transparent order.
North defines "informal rules" in terms of (1) extensions, elaborations, and
modifications of formal rules, (2) socially sanctioned norms of behavior, and (3)
internally enforced codes of conduct.^^ (Formal constraints, on the other hand, provide
order by means of formal-legal structures.) Each aspect of informal rules is elaborated
with the aid of empirical examples.
1. According to the first definition, informal rules denote "extensions,
elaborations, and modifications of formal rules." To provide an example. North invokes
the case of congressional committee power that evolved from its constitutionally
specified task to deal with specific problems of exchange. Committee chairs and
members became endowed with a degree of bargaining power over legislation that cannot
be derived from the formal-legal structure alone but denotes an integral underpinning of
unwritten and customized rules. These unwritten rules, however, did evolve as a
complementary structure in support of the constitutionally specified task.
For details, see North, 1990, p. 40.
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2. To illustrate socially sanctioned norms of behavior, North provides the example
of Alexander Hamilton's decision to engage in a duel. As North vividly describes: "The
night before he was to engage in the duel with Aaron Burr, Alexander Hamilton sat down
and wrote out all the reasons why he should not accept this challenge; a crucial one, of
course, was that he was likely to get killed. Yet, in spite of the overwhelming rational
basis for not dueling, he felt that his effectiveness in the public arena would be
significantly diminished by such a decision because dueling was the accepted way to
settle disputes among gentlemen. Social norms dictated the choice, not formal ones."”
3. The first two types of informal constraints, that North describes, can be
modeled in the context of wealth-maximizing strategies and lend themselves to treatment
in game theory frameworks. Accordingly, rational-calculative styles of theorizing are
singled out as providing a viable basis for inquiring into the first two cases of informal
rules, since rule compliance and institutional design are deducible from wealth-
maximizing strategies. Internally enforced codes of conduct, on the other hand, describe
situations "when the individual gives up wealth or income for some other value in his or
her utility function."^® In this context North points to the example of legislator's voting
behavior, which is not sufficiently explained by interest group models. The analysis of
voting behavior by legislators is deemed to recommend the inclusion of subjective
preferences and value-systems into the research agenda. Within the class of informal
rules, internally enforced codes of conduct, motivations that represent a distinctive
Ibid.
Ibid.
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category, approximates the universal foundation of cultural values by transcending the
narrow margins of economic self-interest and strategic interaction.^’
Approaching informal rules within the context of strategic interaction raises the
question of what might render the distinctive quality of the class of informal constraints.
Formal and empirical informal rules, concerning the class of behavioral norms and so-
called "extensions" of formal rules, follow the same path of origination.^^ Behavioral
norms, as integral elements of a society's cultural heritage, are seen as emerging from
micro-level interactions.^^ Rational decisions of strategic actors transform over time into
habituated forms and stabilized attitudinal matrices. Both types of rules, as previously
mentioned, are deducible from wealth-maximizing strategies that, like formal rules,
mirror the action-specific context of power and interest. Some confusion results form the
behavioral approach to informal rules since the theorem of strategic interaction was
formerly reserved for "hard" types of theorizing that denounced the significance of
cultural variables. As North indicates himself: "The difference between informal and
formal constraints is one of degree. Envision a continuum from taboos, customs, and
traditions at one end to written constitutions at the other. Both types of constraint
North (1990, p.40) refers at this instance to the article of Kalt, Joseph P. and Mark A. Zupan.
1984. "Capture and Ideology in the Economic Theory of Politics." American Economic Review, Vol.74, pp.
279-300.
This argument spares the category of internally enforced codes of conduct, as more
transcendental values in general, whose path of origination is insufficiently clarified from an empiricist
standpoint. North focuses in his inquiry on the category of behavioral norms since they are more conducive
to empirical observation and therefore rational-calculative modulation, whereas non-wealth-maximizing
values are difficult to anzdyze.
North, 1990, p.87; Weber, 1954, p.68.
^ North, 1990, p.46.
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denve (to a certain extent) from utility-maximizing strategies and serve equally (at the
empirical level) the function to reduce complexity in human interaction.
Informal rules, it is suggested, differ from formal ones with respect to their
origination and transmission. "Where do informal constraints come from?" asks North.^^
He himself gives the answer: "They come from socially transmitted information and are
part of the heritage we call culture. The central qualification of informal rules is that
they are part of a society's cultural heritage and that they have been socially transmitted.
What, however, is North referring to when he mentions that informal rules are socially
transmitted information? The term "informal" within this equation signifies the
transmission mechanism by means of which norms are learned and disseminated. This
qualification emerges more clearly from Weber's text where "conventional" (in the sense
of socially sanctioned norms of behavior) become specified with respect to the
"sociological structure of coercion."^^ While the modem state apparatus has the capacity
to ensure the systematic transmission of legal norms by force of its bureaucratic support
structure, social transmission characterizes the absence of this very transmission
mechanism. Freedom from bureaucratic coercion, however, does not obliterate social
control. As Weber emphasizes, informal rule derogation is sanctioned by the social
context, even though a permanently staffed organization to implement coercion is absent.
As a result, it is mainly with respect to the means of coercion that the normative realms of
North, 1990, p.37.
Weber, 1954, pp.20-33.
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society and state-bureaucracy differ. Instead of guaranteeing rule transmission by the
threat of coercive force, social transmission of rules follows the imperative of cultural
inheritance.
Institutional Effects
lowering transaction costs. The effect of institutions on human behavior describes
the concept of transaction costs.^* Institutions (formal and informal) lower transaction
costs because they provide a mechanism for enforcing contractual agreements. Due to the
eclectic structure of the approach, institutional effects are sorted out between formal and
informal constraints.
Informal constraints. Informal constraints are modeled to lower transaction costs
when self-interested agents perceive subjectively felt incentives to live up to the terms of
contract. Integral to this approach is the notion of contractual self-enforcement. Informal
rules are pictured as substituting for a system of bureaucratic coercion when the parties to
the exchange share the behef or perception that it is in their interest to impose informal
constraints on their conduct, regardless of the absence of a sophisticated (third-party)
enforcement structure. Thus, contracts are self-enforcing when human actors are
convinced that informal rules render a viable framework for contract performance.
Consequently, the question arises, under what conditions are strategic actors hkely to
Transaction costs are understood to represent the composite of information and enforcement
costs. Information costs result from the measurement of valuable attributes of exchanged goods, while
enforcement costs arise from the implementation of reached agreements. While the above already discussed
the utility of institutions based on the occurrence of information-related contingencies, the ensuing
discussion emphasizes the costs of enforcing transactions.
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accept the viabiUty of informal rules for structuring incentives in social, economic, and
political exchanges.^^
Informal rules are likely to structure incentives in human exchanges when the
context of action rewards such agency. North focuses on the number of the parties to the
exchange and the evolution of a dense network of social interaction. He postulates that
incentives for cooperative behavior most likely derive from the circumstance in which the
parties to the exchange have a great deal of knowledge about each other and are involved
in multiple transactions. The development of the Law Merchant renders a paradigmatic
example of economic history for such a system of self-enforcing norms.^° This process
started out in medieval Western Europe when merchants from the Mediterranean, the
Germanic and Baltic region were meeting at the great international fairs along the main
routes through Europe. Through evolving business practice, the mercantile community
then devised a cosmopolitan body of rules governing transactions outside the official
jurisdiction of the kings. Leading in this development were Italian merchants who spread
the technology and pertinent rules of credit, including the techniques of negotiable
To be sure, "contracts" and "informal rules" are not the same. The term contract (North, 1990,
p.53) stands here for the different (empirical) ways exchanges get organized, "whether through firms,
franchising, or other more complex forms of agreement that extend in a continuum from straightforward
market exchange to vertically integrated." Informal rules, on the other hand, stand for a heterogeneous set of
normative constraints ranging from empirical phenomena as "habits" to internally enforced codes of
conduct that involve transcendental qualities (see definitions above). In this way, it is possible for informal
rules to deliver an endogenous support structure for contract performance without necessarily specifying the
concrete form of conduct. However, the issue remains somewhat ambiguous since North employs both
terms simultaneously without drawing a clear distinction.
^ The "Law Merchant," according to W. Mitchell (1969) characterizes "a body of rules and
principles relating to merchants and mercantile transactions, distinct from the ordinary law of the land.
Possessed of a certain uniformity in its essential features, it yet differed on minor points from place to
place." Additional features are its evolutionary character, based on evolving patterns of business practice
-
creating his "laws out of his own needs and views," its emphasis on "speedy justice and equity in social
relations, as well as its international scope (Mitchell 1969, pp.lOff.). See also Harold J. Berman (1983,
pp.332-356) and James M. Murray (1999).
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instruments, bills of exchange and promissory notes throughout Western Europe.
Enforceability appeared to have its beginnings in the development of internal codes of
conduct in fraternal orders of guild merchants; those who did not live up to them were
threatened with ostracism. The conception that dense social networking provided for
contractual self-enforcement in the case of medieval merchant practice is re-stated within
other discourses of economic history. Lowry, for instance, argues that formerly, it was the
"protective shell" of a close-knit fraternity of international merchants that mobilized the
necessary quantum of trust and cooperation in order to secure the development of
advanced forms of credit.^*
By invoking conceptions of "internal codes," "fraternal orders," and lastly the
image of "protective shell," the previously described action context involves both
behavioral and transcendental elements. As a consequence, one may question to what
extent the behavioral structure of exchange might actually be shaped in the image of
overiirching belief-systems, or vice versa. The hypothetical case has to be accounted for
that the group of economic actors may actually constitute a "community of believers" that
emulate (by intentional design or accidentally) certain transcendental principles in the
organization of exchange. Besides North, other accounts of economic history are more
explicit on this point by demonstrating that certain belief-systems exerted a positive
influence on economic development and the flourishing of commerce in particular. Thus,
the case is presented that certain hard-to-measure beliefs might eventually be the central
criterion for making informal rules effective and contracts self-enforcing. Evidence for
Lowry, 1979, pp. 246ff.
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such type of reasoning accrues from Weber who demonstrates that merchants were
formerly associated in so-called "cult-communities"^^ that operated under the protection
of their special patron god. Merchants of early Republican Rome, for instance, recognized
Mercury as their patron god. Characteristic of such fraternally organized societies was the
obligation to come to mutual aid in emergencies and the observance of cult meals.
Berman, on the other hand, emphasizes that only the firm belief in the future of the
mercantile community made it possible to circulate various forms of credit in the absence
of legal guarantees.^^ Trade in negotiable instruments without guaranteed state
enforcement is seen to reveal a strong belief in both the integrity and future of the
community to which all debtors and creditors belonged. Within this action context,
individual self-interests merge into a transcendental super-structure that makes informal
norms effective. Contracts are self-enforcing because certain beliefs play an important
role in the incentive structure of human actors.
Leaning towards "hard" types of theorizing. North subsumes "interest" and
"incentive" for contract performance under the umbrella of wealth-maximizing
strategies. Clearly, North abrogates any ambition that would undermine the micro-
foundations of rational choice theory. In contrast to the previously hypothesized
institutional scheme. North argues that beliefs and internally enforced codes "function" as
strategic devices to lower transaction costs. Behef-systems, instead of representing values
Weber, 1954, p. 171; See also The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism. 1992.
Translated by T. Parsons. London and New York: Routledge.
See, for example, Berman, 1983, pp.338-51.
North, 1990, p.56f.
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in their own right, become operational because they are perceived as rendering
enforcement mechanisms in a wealth-maximizing action context. The notion that human
actors embrace certain beliefs out of instrumental utility in order to maximize individual
wealth is central to this perspective.^^ Internal codes and beliefs are thus understood to
derive ultimately from material interests in the service of personal material wealth-
maximization, as expressed in the following statements: "Frequently the exchange is set
within a context of elaborate rituals and religious precepts to constrain the participants."^^
Under what conditions will contracts tend to be self-enforcing? In a wealth-
maximizing world, the answer can be stated very simply. Contracts will be self-enforcing
when it pays the parties to live up to them..."^’' To stipulate whether "it pays" to make
informal rules effective. North calls special attention to the behavioral factor of
"iteration." The foundations of this type of reasoning are rendered by game theoretic
research and in particular the seminal text of Robert Axelrod (1984) The Evolution of
Cooperation, which emphasizes the concept of iteration for inducing cooperative
strategies. The prospect of iterated "games," it is argued, projects a "shadow of the future"
on uncooperative strategies. Gains from iterated cooperation exceed the profitability of
"running off with the profits." As a result, it depends on the utility-maximizing calculus
It is noted, however, that this conception of the transcendental or what was formerly referred to
as cultural endowments contradicts North's assumption (see 3'^^ definition of "informal rules") that internal
codes may not be modeled by means of wealth-maximizing or game theoretic strategies. In addition, North
seems to vacillate between two diverging conceptions of internally enforced codes of conduct. At one
instance he emphasizes the "importance of self-imposed codes of behavior in constraining maximizing
behavior in many contexts is also evident (1990, p.43)." On the other hand, he emphasizes that it would be
"prohibitive" to rely on a "purely voluntary system of third-party enforcement" in an environment marred by
the uncertainties of impersonal exchange characteristics (1990, p.58).
North, 1990, p.35.
North, 1990, p.55.
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of the individual entrepreneur and his perception of the strategic action context in order to
Stipulate whether contracts will be self-enforcing.
Formal constraints. Formal constraints are modeled to lower transaction costs
when economic actors are in the position to resort to bureaucratic coercion to ensure
contract enforcement. North applies in this context the formula of impersonal exchange
in order to discuss a type of economic interaction where contracts are obviously not self-
enforcing. According to this model, it is very unlikely that the parties to the exchange
perceive incentives to live up to the terms of contract with respect to both the strategic
and cultural contexts of action.
The strategic action context of impersonal exchange advises the introduction of
bureaucratic coercion into contractual relations in order to ensure contract enforcement.
Impersonal exchange describes an action context where iteration rates of exchange are
uncertain and where the parties to the exchange have only incomplete and asymmetric
access to information. This includes the attitudinal matrix of the exchanging parties and
the valuable attributes of exchanged goods, as well. Exchanges are complex and highly
contractual. The level of contracts, on the other hand, correlates with the degree of
specialization to be met in an economy. The greater the specialization and the number and
variability of valuable attributes, the more crucial is the availabihty of institutions that
North, 1990, pp.l2, 34, 55-58.
The significance of contract is echoed in S. Todd Lowry's account. He argues that contractual
agreements denote "the" device structuring future economic activities. Lowry contends that contracts are
"individualized systems of economic planning" that create future rights disassociated from the necessary
present existence of either the goods or money as the substance of exchange (S. Todd Lowry, 1979, pp.243-
60). Lowry further argues: "In this very real sense, contract is an instrument of economic planning which
permits individuals to organize the enforceable commitments (raw materials, labor, marketing) requisite for
complex economic undertakings. Without the legal sanction of private contract, economic planning would
be limited to the patterns structured by custom ... or independently controlled resources (Ibid., p.253).
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allow individuals to engage in complex contracting. Thus, the higher the degree of
complexity in economic exchange measured in terms of contractual settings, the greater
the imperative to devise formal constraints becomes. As a result, it obviously does "not
pay to make informal rules effective within the strategic action context of impersonal
exchange. In the context of a wealth-maximizing world, where there are high costs of
measurement and where it is ambiguous whether economic actors feel the subjective
incentive to live up to their contractual agreements, the gains from cheating and reneging
are likely to exceed the gains from cooperative behavior. Impersonal exchange, then,
anticipates the availability of coercive enforcement, usually denoted in the person of the
state, in order to ensure contract fulfillment. As a result, the concern for the probability of
third-party enforcement in business affairs, as Weber acknowledges, is "considerable."'^®
Weber's text, providing a contrasting scheme to strictly behavioral modes of
analysis, opens a cultural perspective on the action context of modem exchange relations.
Underlying is the conception that legal development is conditioned upon power and
perception. In the modem context of strategic action, formal mles, according to Weber's
ideal-typical study, represent legitimate stimuli for business practice when they have been
derived from abstract principles via formally correct and logically consistent
interpretation. The focus rests on formal-rational processes of reasoning. Relevant key
words denote the Weberian concepts of "formal legal rationality" and "bureaucratic
domination." The vision field of socio-political actors is pictured to converge around a
common set of basic understandings, which emphasize the rational capacity of the
Weber, 1954, p.71.
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individual as epitomized by categories of calculability and self-interest.'” The ultimate
belief m the "legality" of abstract rules and the appropriateness of "rational" conduct in
human exchange anticipates that human life has entered a stage of cultural development
where social actors (in an ideal-Weberian sense) recognize the "sanctity" of legal-rational
rules of conduct. Expanding contractual relations represent the increase of anonymity and
the breakdown of former traditions of fraternal standards of performance and
enforcement. It is understood that disintegration of former standards of performance,
evolving from the realm of commerce, prompted the need for an integrated system of
legally enforceable norms.
Both authors, however, acknowledge that the real world situation of exchange
might deviate somewhat from the described categories. "Looking only at the formal rules
themselves, therefore, gives us an inadequate and frequently misleading notion about the
relationship between formal constraints and performance."'^^ On the contrary, as North
elaborates: "I have stated, of course, an extreme form of impersonal exchange, because in
the real world, whether present or past (where impersonal exchange did occur to a
degree), we find all kinds of mitigating circumstances by which parties attempt to assure
compliance."'^'* One of those mitigating "circumstances" render voluntary organizations
that make informal rules effective by lowering information costs about market
participants as, for instance, better business bureaus, credit, and insurance rating agencies.
See Weber, 1954, pp.65-86, 145f, 301-21.
Weber, 1954, pp.39f, 145f, 158-167.
North, 1990, p.53.
^ North, 1990, p.55.
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Institutions, hence, unfold ultimate efficacy in lowering transaction costs when both
formal and informal constraints merge into one coherent institutional framework. This
special case of institutional interplay is considered to matter in Western societies where it
IS "taken for granted" that informal codes of conduct and state enforced rules coincide in
the mind-set of individual agents. As North put it, "when economists talk about efficient
markets, they have simply taken for granted an elaborate framework of constraints. [...1
The institutional constraints that define the opportunity set of individuals are a complex
of formal and informal constraints. They make up an interconnected web that in various
combinations shapes choice sets in various contexts. How does such interplay evolve?
North does not provide a definite formula, but touches on this problem in his analysis of
institutional change, discussed in the next section.
Institutional Origin and Change
Intentional design deriving from calculated self-interest denotes the central
momentum directing institutional change, since it is posited that institutions are the
product of strategic interaction. Institutions change because economic, social, and
political entrepreneurs share the perception that the "re-negotiation" of institutional
constraints maximizes individual utility functions."^^ The gains from cooperation are
measured in terms of alternative pay-off matrices. Entrepreneurs may change the rules of
the game either directly, by devoting resources to new profitable opportunities or
North, 1990, pp.66f.
North, 1990, p.86.
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indirectly, by estimating the costs and benefits of devoting resources to alter the rules or
enforcement of rules. The amount of resources devoted to institutional change depends in
this way on the latitude of expected pay-offs. The analysis, by focusing on cost-benefit
scenarios, then, verifies the behavioral micro-foundations of rational choice by
demonstrating that institutional change is the outcome of strategic interaction.'*’^
This simple model of institutional change, however, appears in a more
sophisticated version in North's text where he constructs a more complex chain of
causation. The analysis then integrates macro-level phenomena of political life by
demonstrating that initial input for change derives from evolutionary variables, like
population dynamics and technological innovation. These variables become operational
via his concept of "relative prices."'*^ Changes in relative prices include changes in the
ratio of factor prices (i.e., changes in the ratio of land to labor, labor to capital, or capital
to land), changes in the cost of information, and changes in technology (including
significantly, military technology). In the mind of the rational and utility-maximizing
individual, structural changes of the human environment are deciphered and computed in
the shape of price variations. Price changes, then, affect human behavior by determining
whether it is in the interest of strategic agents to re-negotiate existing rules. Evolution (as
a macro-level process) thus enters the equation of rational-calculative styles via the route
of relative prices. An example of changing "relative prices" presents the demise of
serfdom. North points out that the late-medieval plague minimized the number of serfs
Max Weber, likewise, emphasized the significance of strategic and thus self-interested behavior
in the creation of new economic rules. "Individual invention" and purposive agreements circumscribe the
primary sources for new legal norms (1954, pp.68-75).
North, 1990, p.84.
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and thus changed the ratio of land and labor in such a way that the parties involved
perceived the usefulness of re-negotiating the contractual framework. Because lords, in
the aftermath of the plague, became more dependent on the subalterns they were forced to
yield in a sequence of "re-negotiations" of the terms of "contract" governing the feudal
relationship. The end result of these re-negotiations, then, ultimately brought about the
liberation of the serfs.
Idgological Change. Another source of institutional change is rendered by
cognitive endowments. On the mental plane of rational decision-makers surface certain
ideas, meanings, and visions, which lead to the re-defmition of individual preferences
concerning the desirability of certain actions. The transformation of individual
preferences, however, might result in discrimination against previous practice at the
macro-level. North refers in this context to the abolition of slavery in the U.S. as an
indicator for the force of ideas. "A major institutional change that by itself cannot be
entirely accounted for by a change in relative prices and in which ideas mattered was the
consequence of the growing abhorrence on the part of civilized human beings of one
person owing another and therefore the rise of the antislavery movement throughout the
world."'^^
The attempt to describe and explain the impact of ideas on human behavior via
cost-benefit-models, however, leaves a bitter aftertaste because it does not keep its
promise to provide a convincing formula for the significance of ideological concepts.
Why should IQ^*' century U.S. cotton farmer feel compelled to envision the critique of
North, 1990, p.85.
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their liberal-minded fellow citizens as something exacting a high price? North does not
account for the case that slave owners did not share the same feelings and beliefs as
members of the antislavery movement. On the contrary, North implicitly presumes the
condition of cultural homogeneity, so that both parties, regardless of their self-interests,
share the same vision concerning slavery. This presumption, however, is
counterproductive to North's general rational-calculative focus. Ideological heterogeneity
instead of cultural homogeneity actually corresponds with strictly wealth-maximizing
strategies. Ignorance of antislavery sentiments on the part of cotton farmers actually
signifies the rational strategy to avoid the high (moral) costs for employing slaves. On the
basis of a game-theoretic context of action, cotton farmers would have been better off to
deliberately ignore the argument of the enlightened critics in order to maximize "utility."
Thus, the provision of a simple mechanism for linking ideological phenomena
with situations of market exchange seems precarious. As North concedes: "...we are still
at something of a loss to define, in very precise terms, the interplay between changes in
relative prices, the ideas and ideologies that form people's perceptions, and the roles that
the two play in inducing changes in institutions."^*^ It is unclear how ideas, meanings, and
visions emerge within the social context. The usual way out is to derive behavioral norms
from game-theoretic models, which, however, are biased towards wealth-maximizing
strategies. Consequently, it is acknowledged that ideas and visions exert a formative
impact on institutional development without, however, being able to provide "neat
models" of cultural development and interplay.^'
North, 1990, p.86.
North, 1990, pp.42, 44f.
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Bargaining. In addition to factors of self-interest and culture, the concept of
bargaining power delivers a crucial analytical tool towards the study of institutional
change. "Moreover, it is the bargaining strength of the individuals and organizations that
counts. Hence, only when it is in the interest of those with sufficient bargaining strength
to alter the formal rules will there be major changes in the formal institutional
framework. This perspective on institutional change corresponds with more recent
styles of rational-calculative analysis that emphasize the power differentials of
negotiating parties.” Power is measured in terms of "threat points," which denote the
option to threaten the other parties to withdraw from the negotiations and to leave the
status quo unchanged, while the costs of non-cooperation would be inflicted on the latter.
According to game theoretical analysis the party with more threat points can be modeled
to claim a "Rambo-position." To the party who finds itself in a Rambo-position, the
continuance of the status quo is a viable option, while the other parties face a dilemma of
providing the "Rambo" with sufficient incentives for invoking cooperative behavior.
Under these circumstances, the attainment of cooperation seems unlikely since
institutional change depends on the consent of that player, whose utility function
identifies uncooperative strategies as a viable "game" option.
Historically, it was the state, and the political elite in particular, which found itself
in a so-called Rambo position vis-a-vis economic agents. Economic history is full of
instances where the political elite made use of its power to advance their self-interests to
the disadvantage of individual entrepreneurship. Weber demonstrates, for instance, that
North, 1990, p.68.
See, for example, Knight 1992 & 1994.
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the development of the legal concept of the modem business corporaUon was delayed in
England because of the domestic power structure.
Generally it appears, however, that the development of the legal structure of organizations has by
no means been predominantly determined by economic factors. This fact is provided primarily by
the sharp contrast between medieval and also modem English developments, on the one hand, and
the continental, especially the German, development, on the other. In English law [...] no concept
of corporation of the continental type was developed until modem times. Apart from mdimentary
beginnings, there was no group autonomy in the sense and scope in which it was taken for granted
in medieval Germany [...] The real reasons for the developments both in England on the one side
and on the Continent, specifically Germany, on the other, were primarily political ones. This
statement applies to the Middle Ages as well as to the early modem period. The essential
difference was this: In England royal power was strong and centralized and, under the Plantagenets
and their successors, disposed highly developed technical means of administration. In Germany, on
the other hand, no political center was in existence.*'*
In England, the establishment of a corporation then depended on special grant and the
concept of limited purpose while being under constant supervision of the state
bureaucracy. The formation of modem commercial law, however, was conditioned upon
the transformation of hierarchical and politicized power stmctures, which traditionally
subjugated the demands of economic entrepreneurs.
The Law Merchant, as the "continental" type of doing business, owes its official
recognition to the circumstance that the political elite abandoned particularistic modes of
governance (autocratic, patrimonial etc.). To attract foreign merchants to the fairs, the
politically established class was frequently ready to abandon the status quo and to
broaden the legal basis of international commercial law. In this sense, a "community of
interest" evolved serving the perceived self-interest at both ends of the political spectrum
since the emergence of capital markets also benefited the state's financial needs. As the
*'* Weber, 1954, pp.169-188.
** Murray, 1999, p.78.
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expanding mercantile community contributed to the economic growth of urbanized
regions, merchants were subsequently granted special rights to administer commercial
law independently. Foreign merchants were allowed to choose mercantile councils and
judges from among their own fellow citizens and to governing themselves under their
own laws. Privileges of "participatory adjudication" were first granted at great
international fairs and markets, which were thereupon extended into permanently
instituted organs of administration at the city-state level.^^ "Consuls of merchants" were
elected to sit on commercial cases that gradually extended their jurisdiction over all
mercantile cases within the city. The northern city-states, assuming the vanguard role
within these developments, at that time, integrated these mechanisms into the permanent
legal framework of their town charters and spread this recipe throughout Europe. Other
European cities adopted the Italian institution of the merchant counsel or else developed
similar institutions for adjudication of commercial cases by merchant judges. The
Freiburg charter of 1120, for instance, stipulated that cases of commercial dispute-
resolution should not be decided on the basis of rules of political authority "but by the
customary and legitimate law of all merchants and especially by the law of the merchants
of Cologne. As a result, the development of mercantile law was largely left to the
merchants themselves, so that the process of institutionalizing the rules of the game began
in a bottom-up fashion. The standards for fulfillment and enforcement of contracts
emerged out of custom and practice which, over time, took on regularity. Compliance
stemmed from the legitimacy of the rules and the fact that businessmen had actively
Berman, 1983, pp.346ff.
” Mitchell, 1969, p.28.
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participated in their development.^* Conditional for this development, however, was
decentralization of political power that provided the mercantile community the
opportunity to formalize their exchange practices.
Berman, 1983, p.340.
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CHAPTER 3
IMPERIAL STATE CAPACITY
Under the imperial regime, state capacity materialized in the prerogative of
Russian officialdom to exercise, among other things, an effective veto right over
corporate development in the Russian lands and to resist business demands to enact a
competitive type of corporate governance modeled on European standards of business
conduct. To better understand this episode of bureaucratic empowerment, the following
section inquires into the institutional bases of the imperial regime. As a consequence, the
question is asked what institutional reasons might have existed to empower Russian
officialdom against the interest structure of society? In addition, the question is raised by
means of what institutional arrangement was the imperial bureaucracy able to resist
societal pressures for change? It is therefore the aim of this chapter to shed some light on
the institutional bases underlying imperial Russian state capacity. As a preliminary
thought, it would seem that the imperial regime was relying on state-centered hierarchical
structuring of interest organization and stratification in order to fashion policy. This
should emerge more clearly from the case study of corporate law reform in 1858-1874.
Prior to discussing such structural concerns, however, it appears logical to inquire into the
affairs of Russian business life in order to give a hvely picture of the historical frame of
reference.
30
Corporate Entrepreneurship in Imperial Russia
Under the imperial regime, corporate entrepreneurship had to deal with a curious
mix of formal legality and informal procedures that, as such, were counterproductive to
the needs of corporate Russia. To observers of the Russian field, it is a familiar narrative
that entrepreneurial initiative was discouraged by means of bureaucratic regimentation
that, in the final analysis, would hinder the evolution of a decent code of conduct. The
condition of bureaucratic tutelage was in this respect especially to the detriment of
smaller and medium-sized businesses that could not afford to go all the way through the
bureaucratic process. In his assessment of the Russian business climate. Professor Ivan
Ozerov noticed in 1916:
The old regime, with all its restrictions and prohibitions, hindered and discouraged all initiative by
making success depend on the authorization of the governing officials. It annihilated all energies,
smothered all humane feelings with the masses, and although industrial energies abounded in
Russia they remained unexploited and of no benefit to anyone, like our forests and mineral wealth.
[...The czarist regime] does not allow a free field of activity to individuals; it imposes restrictions
and hindrances. Without an ukaz a Russian does not dare do anything. This ukaz is so discouraging
that it incapacitates him. ...[Bureaucrats] employ all their energies, edl their intellectual efforts in
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creating hindrances, obstacles, and restrictions.
Of particular significance was the design of entry rules since they were instrumental for
the imposition of bureaucratic tutelage over business affairs. According to the letter of the
law, the so-called concession system mandated that every corporate charter had to
undergo a screening process that would involve the relevant Ministries, the Committee of
Ministers, and ultimately Czar himself who would put his signature under the corporate
Ozerov, Ivan. Problemes economiques etfinanciers de la Russie modeme, Lausanne 1916,
pp.45f. Quoted in T.C. Owen. 1991. The Corporation under Russian Law, 1800-1917: A Study in tsarist
economic policy, Cambridge: University Press.
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chaner. In addition, it was required that every change in the corporate charter had to be
confirmed by the appropriate ministry. The general assembly of stockholders, for
instance, was not allowed to change the terms of economic conduct on their own
authority. It was stipulated that no appeal procedure was available to corporate founders
in case of denied concessions. In addition, the formal-legal basis providing for increased
bureaucratic tutelage over corporate entrepreneurship was enlarged within the course of
the conservative reaction (1881 to 1905). Additional restrictions for corporate business
became effective when influential conservative groups considered it particularly
worrisome that foreigners and Jewish minorities could take control of economic
enterprises in strategically sensitive areas. Obviously operating from a position of power,
the conservative stratum of Russian officialdom succeeded in bringing about legislation
that would increasingly bar foreign investors, and in especially Jewish minorities, from
owning means of production.^®
However, in contravention of the official policy a second set of rules emerged
since it was recognized that foreign participation was urgently needed to sponsor
corporate development in the Russian lands. Parallel to the growing body of restrictive
laws governing joint-stock corporations, the regime established an administrative
procedure that would make it possible for foreigners and Jewish minorities to acquire real
estate in so-called sensitive areas. A legal basis for this kind of rule-derogatory behavior
arose with a decree dating from November 1893. Its substance stipulated that
"exceptions" could be granted on a case-by-case basis. For this purpose, the corporate
Por a more detailed account see T.C. Owen, 1991', and in particular pp.l 18-132 {Restrictions on
foreigners, Jews, and Poles) and pp.171-180 {the reactionary counteroffensive).
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charter would have to receive the signature of the Committee of Ministers and the Czar
himself.
A political consequence of these processes was that a gulf between official policy
and informal legal practice began to emerge under the stewardship of the Czarist regime.
The described legal discrepancies then coincided with a situation where most enterprises
operated in contradiction to the general laws. As Professor Ivan T. Tarasov observed in
1878 :
The development of corporations in Russia in recent years has taken place, as it were, outside the
legislation in force, or even despite it, because it is difficult to find among the charters of joint-
stock companies accepted and confirmed in the past decade a single charter that does not consist
entirely of a systematic collection of exceptions [to the law].*'
In addition, both incorporation procedures, the official concession system and its
unofficial counterpart, underlined the discretionary powers of the imperial bureaucracy to
influence corporate development at will. In this way, Russian entrepreneurs were exposed
to relatively high levels of uncertainty since the imperial bureaucracy, which vacillated
between benevolent neglect and decisive repression, controlled the entry barriers into
business life. In the absence of a consistent system of formal-legal norms, the stakes for
Russian entrepreneurship were high. From the business point of view, it was difficult to
foresee how the autocratic modus operandi would play out in the next moment. Corporate
founders responded to the situation by lobbying for special favors from the imperial
bureaucracy.
*' Ivan T. Tarasov. Uchenie ob aktsionemykh kompaniiakh. Kiev 1878; quoted in T.C. Owen,
1991, p.77.
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A good example describing the administrative contingencies of the concession
system emerges from the memoirs of Baron Nikolai E. Wrangel, dated 1899.^^ An official
turned businessman, Wrangel took the lead in negotiating the incorporation of an electric
power company to be erected in the Caucasus region. Due to the size of the project, it was
planned to give the enterprise the form of a limited liability joint stock venture. The value
of the enterprise was an estimated 7 million rubles of stock to be distributed to leading
petroleum producers and managers of electricity companies. Initial financing was
safeguarded through a loan of the International Bank, headquartered in St. Petersburg. As
stipulated by the 1836 code, the project initiating party, Wrangel and his fellow
entrepreneurs, had to draw up a corporate charter to be presented to the appropriate
administrative organs for approval. Even though the charter received initially a positive
response from the Minister of Finance, Count Witte, the project seemed to come to
nothing since the charter also required the signature of the governor-general of the
Caucasus region. Prince Grigorii S. Golitsyn.^^ To the dismay of the entrepreneurs, this
"crazy petty tyrant [malyi samodur], with whom it was difficult to deal," delayed giving
his permission. Wrangel then resorted to the strategy to win the sympathy of the Caucasus
autocrat by approaching him as a benevolent patron rather than as a rational decision-
As reproduced by T.C. Owen, 1991, pp.l30f.
To explicate the legal specifics of the situation, it should be mentioned that certain additional
restrictions applied for incorporation in the Caucasus region. A decree dating from November 1 893
stipulated that corporations could purchase real estate in the Caucasus region only if their charters restricted
the ownership of stock to Christian Russian subjects, to non-Christian natives of Turkestan, or to natives of
the Central Asian states immediately bordering the area. Moreover, in each case the corporation was
required to submit a petition for permission to purchase land, via the governor-general, to the minister
of
war, who had the power to reject the request or to grant it upon approval of the minister of finance. Three
powerful officials thus were endowed with a significant potential to put their mark on evolving corporate
initiatives according to their personal whims.
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maker. Accordingly, Wrangel awaited the winter social season when the members of the
Russian aristocracy used to gather in St. Petersburg. On this occasion, the Prince seemed
inclined to give his blessings to the project because he recognized the relative advantage
of electrical power lines that posed less of a fire hazard than steam engines in the oil
fields. Golitsyn also seemed pleased that the shares had already been subscribed.
However, his mood changed abruptly when he learned the identity of the potential
stockholders. Wrangel recounts that the Prince could reluctantly accept the idea of shares
being distributed to other corporate enterprises, such as the Siemens and Halske, of which
Wrangel was vice-president. However, Golitsyn lost his temper when Wrangel mentioned
the role of the International Bank and the fact that it was unknown who else would
acquire the remaining shares:
Golitsyn:
Wrangel:
Golitsyn:
Wrangel:
Golitsyn:
Wrangel:
Golitsyn:
"What do you mean, unknown? Does that mean that they could fall into the hands of
Jews £uid foreigners? 1 won't agree to that. 1 will not permit shares to the bearer. How
the foreigners are fleecing Russia!"
"The minister of finance has already allowed them."
"Witte is a Mason and has been bought by foreigners."
"Perhaps, Prince, you have not read his speech in Moscow. He declared that Russia
cannot do without foreign capital. He of course would not have said this if the Czar
refused to allow foreign capital [into the country]."
"What do you mean, the Czar! He doesn't know what he wants and dances to Witte's
tune. He's a milksop [Triapka]V'
"Of course [...] you, Prince, as an adjutant general know the Czar's character better
than I do."
[angrily] "I won't allow it; I won't, I absolutely will not allow it!"^
In the end, Golitsyn's resistance was finally overcome when the Czar himself signed the
corporate charter, which listed two Russians, Nikolai E. Wrangel and Viktor F. Golubev,
as founding parties. From the short anecdote some useful data emerges concerning the
^ Baron Nikolai E. 1924. Vrangel, Vospominaniia. Berlin, pp. 158f; quoted in T.C. Owen, 1991,
pp.l30f.
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uncertainty level that Russian entrepreneurship was exposed to. Certainly, the more
obvious theme in the narrative of Baron Wrangel denotes the spread of xenophobic
sentiments among the Russian gentry. In this particular case, the incorporation of an
enterprise with a potential for high rates of return almost failed because of the governor-
general's attitudinal preoccupation. Instead of contemplating analytical aspects of the
business scheme, and acknowledging the economic benefits of the project under
consideration as indicated by Wrangel's devoted talk, Golitsyn's decision hinged
essentially upon his subjectively felt fear of "selhng out" to non-orthodox minorities and
foreigners. In addition to cultural interpretations, the narrative also underlines the
institutional deficiencies of the existing system of incorporation. To be sure, it strikes the
observer to realize the scope of action that Golitsyn was provided by force of the
governing system. Accordingly, the Caucasus autocrat was endowed with the
discretionary powers to impose on business what seemed to eclipse with the reality of his
personal sentiments. While Gohtsyn's initial response bore the connotations of active
involvement in favor of his subjects, the second and decisive impulse advises otherwise.
Driven by xenophobic fears, Gohtsyn neither cared for the bodily security of his subjects
nor the eventual economic benefits associated with the project. In the end, it was the
personal will of the autocratic decision-maker that counted, whose decisions seem to
evolve along contingent streams of consciousness. In imperial Russia, economic agents
thus faced the bizarre situation that, in addition to pervasive problems of bureaucratic
self-interest, relevant decisions were delayed or even ignored because the emotional,
inflating a tendency towards unpredictabihty and spontaneity, subdued the rational
criterion in governmental decision-making.
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Institutional Arrangement
The ensuing inquiry argues that the evolution of an effective corporate governance
regime was compromised because the Russian political input structure restricted policy-
making competency to an asymmetric-hierarchical format of participatory entitlements.
Asymmetries depict in this respect certain influence configurations over policy choice.
Scales of influence are specified on the basis of institutionally determined rules.
Participation, on the other hand, is understood to represent a special kind of political
action that bears the imprint of its institutional environment. Action fields of participation
emerge within the government system or along the state-society interface. Within the
sphere of government activity, the study focuses on constitutionally specified organs of
legislative authority and bureaucratic action channels in order to assess the inner-
governmental configuration of influence. Thereupon, the analysis inquires into the design
of state-societal exchanges in order to clarify to what extent societal actors do have access
to rule-making authority. Within this overall analytical context, the picture of the
politically fashioned input structures should emerge.
Constitutional Constraints
The analysis of constitutional structures delivers an ambiguous message in
determining state capacity. This situation is largely due to the delicate position that
constitutional concepts are placed within the Russian context. In cultural studies, it is
observed that the realities of a relatively arbitrary operating regime appear to prejudice
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notions of consUtutional constraint.® Under the imperial regime, the executive branch
had the discretion to decide whether and to what extent constitutional structures might
constrain government operations. In principle, even the institutional structure of
government itself was conditional upon autocratic will power. According to tradition, the
autocratic ruler was above the law, not bound by it, nor responsible to anyone or anything
beyond himself. Emphasizing autocratic prerogative, cultural analysis frequently refers to
Article 1 of the Complete Collection of law, which stipulates that: "The All-Russian
Emperor is an autocratic and unlimited monarch. Obedience to his supreme power not
only from fear but also from conscience is ordained by God Himself."^^ In this manner,
the autocratic ruler was endowed with a rightful claim for unlimited legal authority.
In practical terms, the autocrat had discretionary powers to change the format of
legislative procedure at any time. Definition of policy instruments, as well as the selection
of decision-making arena was conditional upon autocratic consent. As established by
Article 53 of the fundamental laws, executive authority could choose from a large range
of possible legislative procedures. Available alternatives according to which a law could
be formulated included codes [ulozheniia], statutes [ustavy], establishments
[uchrezhdeniia], charters [gramoty], ordinances [polozheniia], instructions [nakazy],
manifestos [manifesty], ukazes, opinions of the State Council [mneniia
Gosudarstvennogo sovetd], and reports [doklady] vouchsafed in the emperor's
“ The classical texts are Berman (1963) who gives an extensive account of the judicial system;
Brzezinski (1962) who focuses on the dominant position of executive authority in governmental inter-
branch relations; and Pipes (1974) who provides an interesting study of increasing violence injudicial
affairs.
Berman, 1963, p.211.
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confirmation.^^ In addition, the autocratic ruler was endowed with the discretion to freely
determine the playing field for policy-making. Standing at the center of the political
arena, the Czar had the freedom of choice from which of the various government organs
to receive advice in legislative affairs. Even though the State Council took on a central
role in the coordination of legislative activity (see below). Article 53 clearly implies that
it was far from obligatory to process legal projects through the State Council. As
confirmed by an imperial order of November 1851, the possibility was acknowledged to
circumvent State Council procedures by means of ministerial reports. Ministers with the
Czar's approval issued administrative rulings with the force and scope of law. Procedural
requirement for such action was that the issue under consideration touched
simultaneously upon several ministries. Not surprisingly, as Whelan indicates, few
projects failed to meet this criterion.^^ The Czar could, at his pleasure, have laws
processed through organs other than the State Council. During the reign of Alexander HI,
for instance, various ordinances concerned with state security, the press, and Jews were
confirmed and enacted after having been pushed through the Committee of Ministers.
Another procedure to avoid Council scrutiny, it was customary for the autocratic ruler to
make use of one or another agency of his personal bureaucracy to work out crucial pieces
of legislation. Thus, a good many legal issues were handled by the ever-proliferating
divisions of His Imperial Majesty's Own Chancery or by one of his specially created
secret committees and commissions.
Whelan, Heide W. 1982. Alexander III & the State Council: Bureaucracy and Counter-Reform
in Late Imperial Russia. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, here at p.49.
Whelan himself refers [footnote 19] at this instance to A. S. Alekseev, Russkoe gosudarstvenno
pravo, p.261.
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In the exercise of their consultative function, government organs, however, could
never go beyond the outer limits set by any given Czar. The scope of institutional
autonomy of legislative procedure therefore varied widely, not only between but also
within reigns. The government organ of the State Council provides in this respect an
interesting case since its significance for legal matters oscillated between high priority
and remote meaninglessness for the affairs of the central administration. Created in 181 1,
the Council was to serve as the central consultative body for legislative matters. Its
primary function was the consideration of legislative projects before presentation to the
Supreme Power. Official Council policy prescribed that the Czar had to involve the
Council into policy-making. This procedural requirement was expressed in Article 53 of
the fundamental laws (1832) according to which "intended implementation" of legal
projects would include the provision "after having heard the opinion of the State
Council. In addition. Article 50 stipulated the principle of overriding autocratic
decision-making power: "All legal projects are to be examined in the State Council and
submitted to the emperor's discretion; only by the action of the autocratic power can they
be given the intended implementation." However, neither in practice nor in theory did the
wording of the formula in any way restrict the autocrat's prerogative to pay no attention to
the advice or opinions given him. Even the observation of such minimal procedural
requirements came in conflict with imperial sense of authority. Whelan delivers in this
context an enlightening example of the basic situation. Expressing his aversion towards
regularized institutional procedures, Nicholas I uttered: "Really, when I decide something
Quoted in Whelan, 1982, p.48.
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IS useful and beneficial, do I first have to ask without fail for the agreement of the
Council?"'^®
For his choice of affairs, the autocratic ruler was, in effect, not accountable to
anybody beyond himself On the contrary, legal accountability was the prerogative of the
Czar. Legislative bodies, whose members were hand-picked by the Sovereign Power,
performed only advisory functions. The Council had no power either to initiate or to
promulgate legislative projects; its function was purely advisory, and the Czar remained
free to accept, reject, or modify at will the Council's recommendations. The delimited
scope of institutional autonomy in Council activities emerges clearly from the first three
articles of the Establishment:
1 . In the hierarchy of state institutions, the Council is the body [soslovie] in which all parts of the
administration are ordered in their principal relations to legislation, and through it they rise up
to the Supreme Imperial Power.
2. Therefore, the preliminary drafts of all laws, statutes, and instimtions are submitted to and
considered by the State Council and then, by act of the Sovereign Power, forwarded for
implementation.
3. No law, statute, or institution may issue from the Council and be implemented without
confirmation by the Sovereign Power.’'
As a result, a whole series of conflicting and contradictory norms and procedures
governed the legislative process. Political issues tended to be decided by shifting
procedures and by the interplay of various bodies and certain favorites or persons
revolving around a formally supreme sovereign. The proliferation of legislative organs
ultimately evolved into a diffuse network of competency. A clear demarcation of spheres
of influence, as characteristic for constitutionally delimited government, was absent.
’“Whelan, 1982, p.53.
’' PSZRI [Polnoe sobranie zakonov rossiiskoi imperii], sen, 31 (1810-1811), No.24064, quoted
in Whelan, 1982, p.41.
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Under conditions of procedural uncertainty, it was difficult to perceive which of the
involved parties had a rightful claim to policy-making competency. To be sure, as long as
legislative authority depended upon the temporary will of the autocrat, it was always
within executive discretion to select the format of participation in policy-making on an
ad-hoc basis. Once again, the old regime undermines institutional development by
interfering with the ground rules of the political game. This tendency manifested itself
most clearly within the domain of legislative activity. Within legislative procedure, the
autocratic modus operandi nullifies notions of genuine participation. Components of
participation, as they emerge from legislative procedure, were usually removed from the
public, lacking transparency, and certainly allocative efficiency. Accessible only to a
small number of favorites and bureaucratic staff, the structure of social input chances
hinged upon the personal discretion of the autocratic ruler.
Action Channels
Administrative practice differed substantially from the proclaimed ideal of
autocratic omnipotence. Far from being involved in all kinds of political transactions, the
capacity of the autocrat to cope with the flood of legal projects awaiting his decision
turned out to be rather limited. To be sure, under the old regime thousands of singular
legal issues were propelled to the highest echelons of government swamping the office of
the autocrat. The Czar, however, exercising his discretionary powers on a rather tight
schedule, could not possibly manage all of the political affairs awaiting imperial action.^^
The empire had become too complicated for one man to run, even with the help of any
For a detailed description of Nicholas II working day schedule, see Vemer, 1990.
42
number of favorite assistants; too many questions demanded expert opinion, too many
matters required not just consent or denial, but informed consent.
To remedy the situation, Alexander I created the State Council. Its purpose was to
service the informational needs of imperial decision-making. However, as previously
indicated, the Council was not to trespass the limits set by autocratic discretion. As a rule,
the Council should operate only as a regular consultative body to the Czar. Its official role
was to assist the Czar in legislative affairs by submitting informed recommendations for
imperial action. In this consultative function, the Council had de Jure discretion to work
as the central coordination mechanism Unking the Czar with the other parts of
government. However, even the State Council itself gave rise to organizational
deficiencies, which it was supposed to cure. Circumstantial evidence for such difficulties
emerges from a note of a Council member written in 1884. Expressing his dissatisfaction
with the organizational inefficiency of the system, B.P. Mansurov complained: "if a
member of the State Council does his business as he should, it is impossible for him
either to search out alUes or foresee on his own everything that he should - nor, for that
matter, can he even read everything through properly.
The void separating official intent from de facto reaUty, then, was increasingly
filled by bureaucratic support structures. As supreme government bodies had to wrestle
with overload, auxiUary organs emerged to take increasingly control of "business." Of
central significance in this respect was the State Chancery {Gosudarstvennaia
kantseliariia) that transacted all kinds of Council business. All informational materials
Whelan (1982, p.43) characterizes the author of the quote, B. P. Mansurov, as one of the "most
diligent" and "conscientious" Council members.
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going in or out of the Council passed through the Chancery and its pertinent subdivisions.
The Chancery functioned in this respect as a resource center for the so-called supreme
organs (verkhovnye organy) of government.
The significance of Chancery staff emerges clearly in connection with Council
procedures. Even though the Chancery served as an auxiliary organ, it is significant to
point out that its organizational infrastructure was distinct from that of the Council. The
Chancery was managed by a functionary called the state secretary (Gosudarstvennyi
sekretar'), a direct appointee of the Czar. The state secretary was not a Council member,
and his position was independent of the Council. He had the discretion to appoint
divisional staff, which by the 1880s numbered more than double that of the Council itself.
As mentioned above. Chancery staff operated all business transactions going in and out of
the Council. Informally established procedure was that proposals for policy-making
would be dealt with on a preliminary basis by Council divisional staff. After due
deliberations. Chancery staff, versed in adequate legalese, then would go on to transcribe
the preliminary results for presentation to the General Assembly (obshchee sobranie) of
the Council. Within the course of Council procedures. Chancery staff was responsible in
keeping track of pending deliberations and for recording them in journals (zhumaly).
From the journals, a so-called memorandum (memoriia) would be extracted to submit to
the Czar the project under consideration. The memorandum would include an outline of
the project, a report on the debate it had occasioned, and any changes resulting from that
debate. According to the channels of political action, the information provided in
memoranda delivered the final stage of input for imperial decision-making.
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Influence by Chancery staff on the processing of legal issues had enormous
potential. Council members, and even the Czar himself, received necessary information
on pending projects through the Chancery. Such influence was all the greater since it was
literally impossible for individual members of the decision-making arena to deal
responsibly with the ever-growing volume of business presented for informed consent.
The official policy-making organs, coming down to the nitty-gritty of legal drafting and
policy-coordination, increasingly relied on Chancery expertise because its staff was
versed in the techniques of legal transcription and interpretation. As a result, the
Chancery's importance as a power base grew steadily over the course of the nineteenth
century since it functioned as the central coordination mechanism that moved the points
of legislative affairs through the state apparatus.^'^ The cmx of the matter, however, was
that increased reliance on bureaucratic expert opinion promoted the cause of bureaucratic
tutelage by deflecting government attention from informed consent within the State
Council towards secluded areas of executive decision. Of course, such political
tendencies undermined the already fragile basis of quasi-parliamentary structures.
Bureaucratic influence over policy-making reinforced in this regard already existing
trends of political inequality and procedural uncertainty.
Interface Linkages
As indicated above, this section of the analysis inquires into institutionally
determined structure of state-societal exchanges. In particular, an effort is made to clarify
to what extent societal actors are provided with the opportunity to deliver input in the
''‘Whelan, 1982, p.46.
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policy-making process. Or, to put it differently, it is questionable by what organizational
rules the state might have delimited chances for societal input?
To the informed observer the assumption probably appears puzzling that there is
something like an interface in Russian pohtics. To be sure, within state-societal relations,
the term implies the concept of a political arena where both types of actors meet, state and
societal, to engage in political exchanges. The democratic concept of state-society
interface usually involves a two-way communication model conditioned on such qualities
as formal equality and voluntary cooperation. Based on democratic political traditions, it
is assumed that the parties to the exchange meet on a somewhat equal footing in order to
amve at a mutually beneficial agreement, or contract.
The Russian experience differs from this concept substantially because it is based
on a one-way model of political communication. According to the study of basic state-
society communications, the image of a self-centered state apparatus emerges that
actively restricts the spectrum of chances for societal input. Central to the study of
interface communications then is the theme of an enduring state-society antagonism: the
image of dual Russia. The classical texts are Herzen (1853) and Tucker (1979), Both
authors share the concept of a culturally entrenched state-society cleavage. Alexander
Herzen created the formula of the "two Russias" by arguing that:
One the one hand, there was governmental, imperial, aristocratic Russia, rich in money, armed not
only with bayonets but with the bureaucratic and police techniques taken from Germany. On the
other hand, there was the Russia of the dark people, poor, agricultural, communal, democratic,
helpless, taken by surprise, conquered, as it were, without battle.^^
Alexander Herzen quoted in Tucker, Robert C. 1971. Soviet Political Mind'. Stalinism and Post-
Stalin Change, revised edition. New York: Norton, here at p.l24.
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Introducing the formula of "dual Russia" into a larger analytical context, Tucker creates
the metaphor of "the image of dual Russia" by observing:
Far from developing as a dependent political 'superstructure' over the social-economic 'base.' the
Russian state organism took shape as an autonomous force acting to create or recreate its own
social base, to shape and reshape the institutional pattern of society, in a series of revolutions from
above. [...] The exploitative relation of the state to the society brought an extension of coercive
controls and the hypertrophy of the centralized governmental system.’*
Similar to Herzen, Tucker conceives likewise high levels of violence in state-society
exchanges. The state is pictured as maintaining an exploitative relation vis-a-vis society.
It is understood that the state took control of society in a manner of an occupying power
dealing with a conquered populace. To be sure, it is historical fact that Russian non-state
actors were in a position of extreme disadvantage vis-a-vis state actors. The same pattern
persists with regard to pohcy choice. Rule-making authority traditionally was considered
the sole privilege of the state. State-centered legal authority was exerted as "top-down"
approaches towards legislation. Based on a hierarchical understanding of political
organization, the autocratic regime engaged in a conscious effort to diminish societal
access to policy-making bodies. Thus, it is probably fair to argue that the dominant game
strategy was to maximize control over state-society interactions, and to forestall the
emergence of a two-way playing field for pohtical exchanges. To put it differently,
control over interface communications and top-down approaches of legislation belong to
the same game plan.
’* Tucker, 1971,p.l23.
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By what organizational rules did the state delimit chances for societal input?
Judging on the basis of cultural studies, it would appear that Russian regimes
managed to exert a controlling influence over interface exchanges by implementing a
certain social program. The consequence of social reforms would be the forceful binding
of social strata into a state-centered hierarchy of rank. Intermediate steps included the
establishment of status-defined privileges and duties towards the state. High positions
within this system were then rewarded with special privileges and rights vis-a-vis lower-
positioned class members. Notables and favorites were provided with exploitative rights
vis-a-vis lower strata and authoritative protection of those rights in exchange for absolute
loyalty of the nobility to the power center. The introduction of the Table of Ranks by
Peter the Great in 1722, designed to establish a strict official hierarchy based on service to
the state rather than on ancestry, belongs to this category.
An especially effective instrument for establishing hierarchies and exploitative
social relations proved to be status-defined property rights. The autocratic government
abolished by means of "reforms" the principle of previous private property rights in land
ownership, and granted them thereafter on a conditional basis only to loyal military
officers and members of the aristocracy. The aristocracy, encountering the infringement
of their customary rights, in turn, gained certain exploitative rights vis-a-vis the
peasantry, accomplished through the enslavement of the peasantry as enacted by the 1649
Law Code (Ulozhenie). The 1649 Code stipulated that peasants occupying lands granted
to loyal members of the aristocracy and military became bound to the land as well as to
For an overview concerning data and "The Structure of the Peasantry, see White, Stephen.
1979. Political Culture and Soviet Politics. New York: St. Martin's Press, here at pp.55-63.
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the landlord and the Czar. The Russian autocracy thus succeeded in binding the societal
strata into state-centered hierarchies through the authoritative allocation of land. Although
Catherine the Great attenuated the concept of conditional property rights in land in 1782
by establishing the concept of absolute ownership, the law was restricted to the nobility.
Whereas the gentry gained independence from service obligations to the czar, the
peasants remained bound to the land and to the landlord for another century,
compounding the injustice against them. Property rights thus depended on access to
executive power and the momentary will of the ruler, in contrast to the kind of stable
contractual agreements between monarch and social constituents that occurred in Western
Europe at this time.^*
Similar tendencies prevailed in the domain of corporate activity where scholarly
refined competence concerning the management and governance of corporations was
confined to the military-bureaucratic elite. Since new forms of business operations
demanded an input of technological know-how, it was a natural consequence that the
bureaucratic elite would play a crucial role in Russia's corporate development. The
emerging banking and corporate sector then had little to choose but to hire a large number
of czarist bureaucrats. From the Ministry of Finance, 225 bureaucrats held 251 posts in
corporations, mutual credit societies, and other enterprises; thirteen were presidents of
Boards, fifteen were members of Boards, twenty sat on audit commissions, and twenty
served as bookkeepers and other technical personnel.^^ Evgenii I. Lamanskii, for instance,
was vice-director of the State Bank and its director (1866-81) after the retirement of
White, 1979, pp.41ff.
Owen, 1991, p.91.
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Baron Stieglitz. He also occupied the presidency of the Volga-Kama Bank council, the
Russian Bank for Foreign Trade council and was also a stockholder of the Moscow
Merchant Bank and a member of the Petersburg Mutual Credit Society. By virtue of
holding these prestigious offices, Lamanskii was able to influence significantly the design
of emerging corporations, especially in the railway business.
Executive decisions, how to go about corporate business affairs and the like, was
concentrated in the hands of the imperial bureaucratic elite. A major cause for this state of
affairs was the technological backwardness of the broad mass of the Russian mercantile
class. In 1873, Babst, a representative of the "enhghtened" stratum of Merchant Moscow,
addresses this issue expressively by complaining: "Of commercial and industrial men
with a comprehensive knowledge and understanding of contemporary forms of trade and
of banking in particular, there are almost none in Russia."^® To be sure, the stratum of
'enlightened' entrepreneurs that was open towards Western forms of education and
technological advance was quite small at the turn of the century. Alfred Rieber estimates
the numerical strength of this group to approximately 100 families. The bulk of
merchants remained loyal to traditional customs and beliefs that, as such, were
antithetical to Westernization.
Owen demonstrates the natural distrust of innovation typical of the traditional
Moscow Merchant of the period by relating two anecdotes, which are reproduced here to
Quoted in T.C. Owen, 1991, p.87.
Rieber, Alfred J. 1982. Merchants and Entrepreneurs in Imperial Russia. Chapel Hill:
University of North Carolina Press, here at p.421.
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give a Uvely image of the situation.*^ It is reported that Moscow Merchants were reluctant
to make use of the newly established stock exchange building, erected in November 1839.
They preferred instead to trade outside the new building. This situation was even more
amazing since the temperatures were clearly below freezing point causing them actually
to stand and converse in the snow. It then required police action to compel them to enter
the new building. However, the merchants moved only to its terrace and steps, but not to
the interior of the stock exchange building! Likewise, Moscow Merchants are reported to
have shunned the new railroad built between St. Petersburg and Moscow (1842-51).
Vladimir Alekseev (1795-1862) and several other prominent merchants were summoned
to St. Petersburg to thank the Czar for the newly built railroad. The Czar then asked them
how they enjoyed the trip by train and the much shorter travel period of 14 hours.
However, the merchants remained mute and embarrassed to give an answer. After some
irritation the autocrat left the room. The merchants then confessed to an aide that out of
fear of the train they had all traveled by stagecoach. This was reported to the monarch,
who made them promise to return to Moscow by rail. The next day, Alekseev boarded the
train alone. In Bologoe station at midpoint, where the southbound and northbound trains
stopped simultaneously to refuel, Alekseev went off to take some refreshments. Spending
too much time at the buffet, he rushed out at the third bell, but used the wrong door and
so boarded the northbound train by mistake. In conversation, he soon learned of his
neighbor's destination. "How marvellous!" he exclaimed. "The same train that is taking
you to Petersburg is taking me to Moscow. Devilishly clever, these Germans!" Confused
Owen, Thomas C. 1981. Capitalism and politics in Russia: A social history of the Moscow
merchants, 1855-1905. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, here at p. 15.
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and humiliated because of his blunder, Alekseev cursed the "gadget", left the Petersburg
railroad station, and rode back to Moscow on the stagecoach.
In the final analysis, asymmetric patterned allocation of technological know-how
produced two side effects. First, the emergence of a genuine business class strong enough
to develop a coherent group identity and socio-political interests independent of the state
bureaucracy and foreign involvement seemed unlikely. Second, hierarchically patterned
socio-pohtical organization under the stewardship of the Czarist regime continued to play
a crucial role in determining the course of business activities. As a result, the chance of
bottom-up codification of best practice rules seemed unlikely. The formation of
normative prescriptions governing business activities as well as the decisive impetus for
economic development had to emanate from the top of the political hierarchy. Against
this background, it becomes clear why the building of social consensus on economic
policies, and institution-building in particular, turned out to be such a delicate adventure.
The state apparatus, functioning as energizer for economic development, was provided
with extensive powers to direct and spur social activities, which, on the other hand,
proved counterproductive to the building of commercial law institutions. Even though, or
exactly because the top executive could dictate the rules of the game, the project of
institution-building (assuming that there was such an intention at all) vanished from the
pohtical agenda since both entities, state and society, did not feel compelled to observe
the official policy. The fallacy being that the state apparatus made extensive use of its
discretionary power to manipulate existing legislation, while the social base of Russian
merchants and entrepreneurs was not able to emerge from the long shadow of the state to
breathe life into the autocratic prescribed rules.
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Corporate Law Reform. 1858 - 1 S74
This section will focus on how the rules of the game played out. Of particular
interest is whether the asymmetric format of participatory components in effect
prejudiced institutional development. Intermediate analytical steps involve a process
study of corporate law reform, as it became visible within the reign of Alexander II. To
see how the imperial regime determined business-level preferences is of vital interest.
The analysis then proceeds to an assessment of de facto participation. On the basis of the
data, the study comes to the tentative conclusion that the hypothetical base line of the
argument will be verified because participatory components appeared to have an effective
impact on organizational behavior.
Agenda-Setting
In 1858, Alexander II exercised his discretion to delegate the issue of corporate
law reform to Finance Minister Reutem. By force of imperial discretion, Reutem was
commissioned the task to serve as chairman in the process of reviewing existing
legislation on joint-stock corporations. Thus, it was made official that corporate law
reform was part of the regime's agenda. In the interest of this research paper, the question
then arises concerning the kind of inputs that might have affected the decision of the
autocrat. Or, to put it differently, what was the constellation of forces that appeared to
move the autocrat to initiate the pertinent policy-making process?
On the basis of available data, it would seem that the course of events leading to
the autocratic decision followed an established procedure of ministerial consultations. In
accordance with established procedures, the decisive impetus for putting corporate law
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reform on the agenda came from Finance Minister Reutem. To be sure, jurisdictional
competence and economic self-interest were sufficient motivation for the Finance
Minister to push the agenda of corporate law reform. Reform was of immediate interest to
him since an expanding company sector would enhance the tax extraction facility of his
ministry and therefore underline the utility and prestige of his bureaucratic domain. It is
significant to point out, however, that such calculus played a rather limited role in this
particular case. According to available data, it seems that the personal features of the
Finance Minister, especially his initiative and standing power, exerted a determining
influence on the course of events.
Societal support for this cause, to the surprise of the unsuspecting observer, came
from the intelligentsia rather than from business groups. Looking towards Western
Europe, members of the intelligentsia came to appreciate the liberal political ideas in
general and the role of a law-based state in particular. To be sure, such ideas were very
appealing to an audience that was accustomed to the vacillations of an arbitrary operating
imperial bureaucracy. With the solemn intent to put an end to arbitrary government a new
consciousness was advocated. In the field of company organization, such ambition
translated into advocacy for the abolition of the concession system. To outhne the
essential points of criticism that were alive within the intelligentsia, Owen refers to an
"important speech" of Semen Pakhman (Pachmann).*^ A leading proponent for reform,
Pakhman demanded the abolition of the many "formalities" of the 1836 legislation.
Speaking at Kharkov University, Pakhman emphasized in particular the benefits of "the
Owen, 1991, p.57.
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principle of freedom for joint-stock activity." In the same spirit, Pakhman criticized the
ubiquitous tendency of the bureaucracy to function as a "yoke" to the Russian people.
Particularly disturbing, criticized Pakhman, was the state tutelage because of its adverse
effect on the capacity of economic actors to take care of business. State tutelage over
industry, in the words of Pakhman, "teaches the people to hope, to expect, and to demand
everything from the government, while the people remain inactive, having lost the ability
to think about itself. Progress in the affairs of corporate governance, he suggested,
should be attained through "open discussion" (glasnost) and "responsibility"
QC
(otvetstvennost).
As it turned out. Finance Minister Reutem himself showed interest in the new
ideas of glasnost. Reutem, consulting regularly with the enlightened stratum of Russian
society, then took the initiative to push the reform agenda. To be sure, within government
only a relatively small circle of proponents supported the ideal of glasnost, which, in the
following decades of reform and counter-reform, were steam-rolled by the more
conservative majority. The policy exchanges between Reutem and members of the
intelligentsia represented a situation-related derogation from overall system
characteristics. To show an open-minded attitude towards liberal segments of society was
certainly not the dominant game strategy of the imperial bureaucracy. Thus, it was largely
within Reutem's discretion to decide how to deal with societal inputs because there was
no systemic pressure for top bureaucrats to embrace societal concerns.
Quoted in T.C. Owen, 1991, p.57.
Ibid.
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Policy-Formulation
In February 1861, the Ministry of Finance initiated the process of policy-making,
presenting a bill one hundred paragraphs long ready for inter-ministerial discussion. It
mainly consisted of a somewhat balanced approach towards reform. Greater economic
freedoms were promised through the abandonment of restriction on future contracts and
unnamed shares, while the concession system, the genuine bone of contention, was to
remain in force. In addition, it stipulated that a sworn statement indicating that one-fifth
of the necessary capital had already been raised was to accompany each corporate charter
submitted for ministerial approval. The official justification for continuing such
restrictive measures was to protect the public from the unpleasant side effects of unguided
economic self-interest.
The draft law then entered the stage of politico-bureaucratic debate where various
ministries and agencies produced commentaries on this proposal between February 1861
and February 1865. The Ministry of Internal Affairs, for instance, sought to impose higher
standards on minimum capital required for incorporating joint ventures in order to
discourage the proliferation of small, "weak firms" and to "limit speculation;" so went the
official justification.^^ Reutem, however, refused to include these provisions into the
reform bill because the signs of an unbroken police mentality on the part of the Ministry
of Internal Affairs emerged as all too obvious from its comments.
Societal Input I. The government, to the surprise of the "informed" observer, also
solicited opinions from business organizations. Historical records of submitted opinions,
however, exist only from two business organizations: the Riga Exchange Committee and
Owen, 1991, p.67.
56
the semibureaucratic" Moscow sections of the manufacturing and commercial councils
(MEC). In its opinion, Riga criticized the one-fifth rule, while Muscovite merchants
favored the issuance of preferred shares, which would carry a preferential right to
dividends. The Ministry of Finance, as expected, rejected the advice from Riga; however,
it considered it worthwhile to adopt the Muscovite proposal. For reasons of analytical
expediency, it appears worthwhile to mention that existing bonds of political patronage
might have played into the hands of the MEC. Muscovite merchants, especially under the
leadership of Naidenov (1877-1905), were known to make up the more conservative
stratum of corporate Russia who better appreciated their traditional place within the
hierarchy of court politics. Moscow Merchants were more fortunate in playing on the
diplomatic repertoire of the times by conveniently engaging in behind-the-scenes
negotiations and performing the proper rituals of due respect to the dominant system of
autocratic-bureaucratic rule and the like. Representatives of the Baltic region, on the other
hand, were known for their rather straightforward approach towards business which, in
political affairs, must have conveyed connotations of undesired provocation and
•
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opposition.
For details on the MEC, see Owen, 1991, pp.66ff; Rieber, 1982, pp. 103-1 11.
Naidenov must have constituted the archetype of conservatism within the arena of Russian
organizational business life. Owen (1991, p. 102) describes him as a personality who integrated the diverse
cultural and political streams of his times. As such, he was well known to be capable of demonstrating
"absolute devotion" to the Czar, while, at the same time, pushing his own agenda of "prudent financial
policies." At the occasion of another bureaucratically orchestrated reform conference, the Tsitovich
Comission (1897-99), Naidenov rendered an infallible proof of his conservatism when he opposed, alone
among the merchants in the empire, the principle of incorporation by registration. In a memorandum to
Witte, the MEC warned that the introduction of the new system would lead the great banks to launch a
multitude of "small companies with inexpensive, unnamed shares" (Owen 1991, p.l47). Thus, what
appeared to liberal segments of corporate Russia as a legitimate reform goal was perceived as a
threat by
the most influential organization of Russian manufacturers in the Witte era.
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Bureaucratic Deliberations I. The unwished-for fate of the Baltic business
opinion, however, turned out to be futile against the background of a politico-bureaucratic
machine that seemed to spin endlessly. Since the process of bureaucratic deliberations
took on Kafkaesque proportions, the Czar himself considered it necessary to step in
repeatedly and urge the bureaucracy to process the issue swiftly. The State Council,
operating as the focal point of policy coordination, however, withstood these reprimands.
Instead, the Council insisted on sending the bill to the Ministry of Justice since the matter
of reform was deemed particularly significant. The Minister of Justice, Count Konstantin
I. Palen, and his subordinates then made a multitude of amendments and counterproposals
that mostly questioned the bill in its entire form. Palen offered detailed proposals for
revision of fifty-six of its ninety-nine articles. In addition, he called for a "fundamental
revision" of the statutes on full and limited partnerships as well as the law of 1836 and
proposed for this purpose to send the bill to all existing corporations for comments.
Finance Minister Reutem, then, returned the bill to the State Council in November 1869,
and signaled his readiness to accept the generality of Palen's amendments to the bill.
However, the revisions made in the previous years were so sweeping that the State
Council considered it necessary to open a new round of deliberations. Finally, in February
1870, bureaucratic deliberations came to a temporary halt when Alexander n gave his
approval to the State Council's proposal to publish the bill and to solicit comments from
the public by September 1. To the surprise of the officials, however, no significant
feedback was registered. It was suggested that manufacturers and investors "had grown
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dazed from watching the bureaucratic carousel of drafting, debating, and delay in the
previous nine years.
Formulations n. After the first attempt failed, a second major effort was mounted
to produce a new law subsequent to the deadline of September 1870. The newly
estabhshed commission composed of officials from the Ministries of Internal Affairs,
Transportation, Justice, and Foreign Affairs was chaired by Aleksander I. Butovskii of the
Department of Trade and Manufacturing in the Ministry of Finance. One of the
commission members, the economist Fedor Gustavovich Temer (originally Thdmer in
German), stressed the importance of entrepreneurship and that of individual initiative for
economic development. Temer was obviously taking up ideas of glasnost as Pakhman
had aired them before. Emphasizing the capacity of self-government, as has been crucial
for Western European legal-economic developments, Temer advocated the establishment
of clear legal guidehnes. He suggested that entrepreneurs should be endowed with a
maximum of freedom in which to pursue their businesses as long as they respected the
law and registered with the relevant authorities. He especially endorsed the legahzation of
unnamed shares in order to facilitate the free circulation of stock, deemed supportive of
the extension of credit in the Russian economy. Otherwise, he argued, state interference
in corporate activity would only damage the prospects for economic growth.
The bill produced by the commission was the first in Russia to advocate for a
streamlined system of registration according to European standards of corporate law.
Companies, according to the draft law, were considered legally incorporated once the first
general assembly approved the charter; all shares were sold and at least one-tenth fully
Owen, 1991, p.68.
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paid for, with the corporation registered at the Ministry of Finance. For potentially risk-
seeking enterprises, in particular banks and brokerage businesses, and projects of national
significance, such as railroad companies, the law mandated an exemption to the rule by
keeping up parts of the concession system. In this way, "potentially fragile entities" had to
obtain ministerial, but not imperial, approval. Apart from dismantling parts of the
concession system, the reform framework included procedural safeguards to protect
minority shareholders. The reform proposal stipulated that owners of only 1/10 of the
company's shares could convene a special meeting of the assembly. Further, anyone
owning at least 1 percent of the stock must be allowed to vote; and no individual could
cast more than half of the votes. Because of these detailed and qualitatively new legal
norms, the reform framework swelled in size to 194 articles. The Ministry of Finance
then granted a provisional approval of the bill on April 6, 1872. The inclusion of
procedural safeguards, however, certainly signaled that the carousel of bureaucratic
deliberations was rotating at another level.
Societal Input n. The bill, upon its provisional approval, was submitted to the
public for comments. The commission, within a half-year period, received approximately
thirty commentaries on the law from newspapers, exchange committees, and other
groups, each of them providing insights from the business point of view. Common to
these comments was a welcoming attitude vis-a-vis the proposed principle of
incorporation by registration. Surprisingly, even the Riga Exchange Committee
emphasized that it valued highly the principle of registration. In its critique, the
Committee focused on minor points because it hoped (in vain) to avoid a long debate that
might doom the reform. The Petersburg business representatives, in the same spirit.
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praised the effort of the Butovskii Commission "to remove from legislation all tutelage
over the pubhc."^° However, there was also agreement among the multitude of business
opinions that the reform bill was still to perpetuate various forms of bureaucratic tutelage.
Owen accounts for a few critical inputs that stand out from the rest.’' The newspaper
Golos (The Voice), for instance, criticized article 52 - obviously a typical Russian
stipulation - by which the finance minister was empowered to annul a company's
registration certificate at any time if inaccurate statements were found in the original
application. Such a procedure placed, so was the opinion, a veritable "sword of
Damocles" over every corporation registered in the empire. Another sensible comment
came from Torgovyi Sbornik (The Commercial Reporter), the newspaper of the Russian
Industrial Society at that time. It criticized the lack of an appeal procedure for rejected
applications.
Bureaucratic Deliberations n. The commission then proceeded to review the
comments of the business organizations in thirty-six more sessions. To what extent the
bureaucrats might have considered the business opinions in their periodic consultation
remains uncertain on the basis of the existing database. Owen merely indicates that the
Petersburg critique was not included in the final draft. Presumably, the autocratic
principle of secretive deliberations remained untouched by ideas of glasnost. Apart from
these traditional ambiguities, bureaucratic deliberations reached their preliminary
conclusion when the Ministry of Finance approved the draft law in March 1874. This
’“Owen, 1991, p.73.
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version, 198 articles long, was forwarded to the State Council for final editing. There, the
bill underwent a few changes that showed the determination of the conservative elite to
ensure the principles of bureaucratic control over business activities. The most notable
outcome of this process was a detailed list of punishments to be imposed on managers
who violated either the general law or the corporate charter.
These efforts again turned out to be futile when Finance Minister Reutem, on the
very eve of final approval, precipitously abandoned the Butovskii bill. At a time when the
reform bill had approached the final stages of editing, a stock market panic broke out in
Europe (1873), leaving Russian legislators in disarray concerning the cause of reform.
Czarist policy makers were so alarmed by the stock-market crisis that, in December 1874,
the CzcU' himself endorsed the repudiation of the Butovskii bill and implemented further
restrictions on corporate development. The emperor wrote that new corporate charters
should be approved only "with extreme caution." This policy was further highlighted in
August 1877, when new companies were approved "only under exceptional
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circumstances."
Participation Levels
In contrast to the ideals of glasnost, it is probably fair to say that reform was
eventually wrecked because a genuine political process that would have moved the
totality of singular wants and preferences into the direction of coherence, or
even
consensus, was missing. Instead an organizational process that bespoke the
incapacity of
the regime to integrate diverse policy choices into a coherent legal
framework existed. On
Owen, 1991, p.77.
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the contrary, the discussed material clearly indicates that the organizing principle of
reform was rarely efficient, or politically expedient. For example, to the neutral observer
it must appear puzzhng why, in 1870, the Butovskii commission deemed it necessary to
start over, even though substantial groundwork had been done in the previous nine years
of reform.
Scope of social input chances. To be sure, even though business organizations
were invited to provide their input at various instances of the reform cycle, their prospects
of having a decisive impact on policy tended to be marginal. As indicated above, opinions
of business organizations were sohcited but not accounted for by the authorities in the
final draft proposal. Sheltered from the public, policy experts were meeting in endlessly
seeming sessions to discuss and draft the legal framework. A common denominator of
these drafting sessions was the production of legal output that would discard most of the
entrepreneurial inputs. For obvious reasons, it is therefore delicate to make an accurate
assessment of the situation since the available database about these quasi-secretive
sessions leaves it largely uncertain what criteria the drafters utilized to discard the lot of
business opinions. It remains even questionable whether business opinions were
considered at all. Russian business representatives for their part showed their
determination to utilize the official invitation to openly discuss their dissatisfaction with
the still enforced 1836 legislation. To be sure, opinions were submitted with due respect
without openly attacking the principle of autocratic governance.
One major reason for reform failure was the dominant position of the imperial
bureaucratic elite within the legislative procedure, which, in the absence of parUamentary
oversight, was delegated the task to come up with recommendations for policy design.
63
The bureaucratic elite clearly imposed a pivotal role in the organization of reform. The
more obvious case involves the State Council that preserved its discretion, in
contravention of the official time frame, to prolong the process of inter-ministerial
deliberations and to send the Butovskii bill to Konstantin Palen. The Minister of Justice,
in turn, called for a "fundamental revision" of the statutes. Although this kind of
organizational behavior might appear self-defeating, one could interpret this sort of
bureaucratic action as an effective indicator for the pivotal role of the bureaucracy within
the policy-making process. Accordingly, bureaucratic power becomes specified by means
of its discretion to make counter-reform proposals or to make amendments to the official
agenda that, in the final analysis, would contravene the emergence of a politically viable
solution. Equally, the discretion of the top bureaucrats to decide when to bring reform to a
halt or to start over again emphasizes their controlling influence over the organization of
institutional reform. In particular the decision of the Finance Minister to abandon reform
after informal consultations with personages outside the official cabinet underlines his
capacity to interfere, in the style of an elevated autocrat, into the legislative process as he
sees fit.
Bargaining Logic. More important than to know who the main culprit of failed
reform was, is the question of how the bureaucratic elite utilized its leverage to influence
the political organization of reform. Within the exercise of their responsibilities,
government agencies took an ambivalent role towards society that, in the final analysis,
would compromise the search for a viable political solution. On the contrary, it is
suggested that the imperial bureaucracy, far from organizing the efficient allocation of
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business-level preferences, operated in a general state of detachment from societal
concerns.
Indicative of this trend are the many instances in which the authorities requested
business organizations to deliver input without, however, granting them significant
attention afterwards. Certainly, one of the main concerns of the imperial bureaucracy was
to keep intact the traditional foundations of the regime in general, and the state-centered
framework of status-defined privileges in particular. To this end, it was prohibitive for
government agencies to provide entrepreneurial groups with a context of action, which
would have dehvered effective participatory components. Instead, the overriding calculus
of Russian bureaucratic politics was to impose on the pohtical process an asymmetric
order of participatory entitlements, preferentially allocated to the higher stratum of
Russian officialdom. To be sure, the emergence of a strong economic base capable of
independently formulating its interests would have posed a threat to the traditional system
of rule. To avert this scenario, the imperial bureaucracy relied on strategies of political
organization, which would prevent the public from having equal access to the policy-
making process. Intermediate measures included tactics of political patronage, secrecy in
decision-making, and a general preference for behind-the-scenes negotiations. The
unheard-of fate of legitimate issues of business, such as, the demand for an appeal
procedure appears to confirm the use of these tactics. To be sure, effective pohtical
participation was not an issue within the bureaucratic elite. Instead, it appears that the
official policy of soliciting societal input was more of instrumental value for the pohtical
elite.
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Outcome
Common to these developments was the fact that the autocratic impulse and
bureaucratic regimentation remained prominent within the domain of corporate
governance. The Russian pohtical elite was in the position to prescribe and delimit the
scope of corporate business activities because of its dominant position within the
domestic political arena. Thanks to the untouched principle of status-defined
participation, the autocratic regime was in the position to hold on to the concession
system for incorporation. With the aid of such a system the Russian autocracy exerted an
effective veto right over corporate development and the idea of self-government in
particular. When the ethnic composition of the stakeholders inspired religiously
motivated counter-arguments the bureaucracy could simply refuse to pass it to the higher
echelons of power. The government was therefore provided with the capacity to mold any
corporation in its own image since every corporate charter had to be signed personally by
the Czar. The bestowal of "favors" falls into the same category since it emphasizes the
discretion of the imperial bureaucracy to intervene in favor of a particular request, or to
neglect it. Under the system of autocratic favors, a particular group of individuals, the so-
called "financial oligarchs" distinguished itself from the mass of Russian entrepreneurs by
taking advantage of the institutional communication rules. Their avenue to business
success usually involved activities in the railroad construction business, which enjoyed a
full-scale boom during the second half of the nineteenth century with (government
guaranteed) high rates of return and other forms of state support. Crucial for success.
See, for example, Petrov, Jurij A. 1996. "Formen, Typen und Besonderheiten des russischen
vorrevolutionaren Untemehmertums, in Russlands untemehmerische Vergangenheit: ein Wegweiser in die
Zukunft?, pp. 31-52.
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however, was to establish close 'working relations' to the higher echelons of bureaucracy
in order to receive favorable concessions, terms of contract and cheap credits. The
brothers Samuil and Lazar Poljakov, descendants from a Jewish merchant, for instance,
established unusually close connections with the Minister for Post and Telegraphy, Count
Tolstoj, and to turn it into a favorable railroad construction concession. Using a fair
amount of cunning and good business instincts Samuil succeeded in becoming the owner
of several railroad corporations. It is reported that Samuil disposed over an enormous
capital worth 30 billion rubles [sic?] at the time of his death in 1888.^'^ This wealth,
however, as contemporaries noted, was due to the shabby quality of railroads constructed
under his control. The stakes of doing business in Russia were therefore disproportional
high for individuals not connected to the imperial chancellery or any favorite of the Czar.
The autocratic regime discriminated in this respect between members of upper levels of
state hierarchy, and individuals outside the official hierarchy without adequate access to
the political patronage.
Ibid., at page 43.
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CHAPTER 4
TRANSFORMATIVE STATE CAPACITY IN THE NEW RUSSIA
To assess the transformative capacity of the Russian polity after the fall of the
Soviet Union, the ensuing discourse inquires into the institutional bases of Russian
reform politics. Because of its institutional orientation, the study focuses on the variables
of participation and interaction. The present analysis of Russian reform politics conceives
in this regard a correlation between the variables of institutional arrangement and the
capacity to transform embedded social behaviors. To examine the significance of
institutional variables the analysis focuses on the issue of corporate law reform. Within
this context the analysis covers the time frame of the Presidency of Boris Yeltsin (1992 -
2000). In tracing Yeltsinite reform politics, the analysis concludes that the presidential
apparatus did in effect duplicate elements of pre-democratic governance. The utilization
of such, it is argued, would eventually infringe upon its ability to conduct an effective
economic reform policy. Its low transformative capacity materializes, in this respect, in
Soviet-type continuities of corporate governance caused by the resistance of Russian
general directors to adapt their behaviors and orientations to the new legislation.
Institutional Arrangement
With the intent to insulate government agency from societal resistance, the
presidential apparatus emerged to implement a series of institutional reforms that would
eventually increase the scope for political maneuvering and tactical moves. Institutional
reforms included a set of policy instruments and action channels that would marginalize
the role of constitutional organs of legislative activity. As a related strategy, the
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Presidency would take steps to disenfranchise and undercut Soviet-type organizations.
The resulting alienation of communist-based groups was to be counterbalanced by a loyal
network of personal friends and favorites, the new "Kremlin Oligarchy." The analysis
refers in this context to the delicate web of "court politics" and extra-constitutional
arrangements that, in fact, revolved around the Yeltsin family.
Inter-Branch Relations
Within the affairs of government, entitlements to affect policy design have the
tendency to cluster around the presidential apparatus. To maximize its influence, the
Yeltsin Presidency made substantial efforts to institutionalize a set of policy instruments
and action channels that would eventually diminish the constitutional principle of
parliamentary sovereignty. Recent studies have in this respect highlighted the systemic
conflict between the elective nature of the presidency, on the one hand, with the
requirement of democratic legitimization for governmental power, and the autocratic
character of that very power, on the other hand.^^
Newly established freedoms of parliamentary sovereignty (Article 94) are
diminished by tendencies of power concentration within the executive branch of
government. A common point of reference delivers in this respect Article 90 of the 1993
Constitution. The presidency, according to this stipulation, has the prerogative to assume
Lilia Shevtsova interviewed in Trud, June 18, 1999, as translated in The Current Digest of the
Post-Soviet Press Vol.51, No.24, p.9. See also Eugene Huskey. 1999. Presidential Power in Russia.
Armonk, NY: Sharpe; Virginie Coulloudon. 2000. "The Divided Russian Elite: How Russia’s Transition
Produced a Counter-Elite," in Building the Russian State, pp.67-87; M. Steven Fish. 2000. "The Executive
Deception: Superpresidentialism and the Degradation of Russian Politics," in Building the Russian State,
pp. 177- 192.
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legal authority in policy areas, which have not undergone parliamentary regulation.
According to Article 90 the President is empowered to issue decrees and directives that
are in force throughout the territory of the Russian Federation. The decree powers entitle
the President to establish the legal basis upon which the executive branch of government
may pursue its policy. Moreover, the presidency disposes over the procedural means by
which he may expedite his choice of affairs in against parliamentary resistance.
An especially effective instrument that emerged was the presidential discretion to
dissolve the State Duma. Intended as a check on presidential power, the constitution
prescribes that the President needs parliamentary approval for his latest choice with
respect to the affairs of government. Additional features stipulate that the President has
the option to dissolve the State Duma if it rejects his candidate for Prime Minister three
times. Article 111 states: "After the State Duma rejects three candidates to the office of
Chairman of the Government of the Russian Federation, the President of the Russian
Federation shall appoint the Chairman of the Government of the Russian Federation,
dissolve the State Duma, and call new elections." Designed as an unlikely exit strategy,
such entitlement was utilized as a very powerful bargaining chip within the course of the
Yeltsin Presidency. Yeltsin made extensive usage of the threat of parliamentary
dissolution to force the deputies to submit to his will by approving his budget, confirming
his latest choice for premier, and the like. Yeltsin clearly demonstrated, on the other hand,
that he could change Prime Ministers four times between March 1998 and August 1999.
Sacrificing unpopular ministers enabled Yeltsin to defuse the rising hostility of
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Parliament and the nation. As Huskey put it: "Like a seated beast, following each sacrifice
the parliament lost for a time the will to stalk the executive,
State Duma deputies, on their turf, were not able to mount an effective
impeachment procedure against the President. Despite several attempts to impeach
President Boris Yeltsin, members of Parliament would eventually succumb to the
complexities of the legal procedure. To be sure, according to the letter of the law it is
virtually impossible to remove a Russian President from office. As established in Article
92 of the Russian Constitution, two-thirds of the State Duma must vote to charge him
with high treason or "some other grave crime." These charges must be validated by the
Supreme and Constitutional Courts. In addition, two-thirds of the Federation Council
must vote to remove him within three months of the fihng of the charges.^^
By formalizing such power asymmetries, it seems reasonable to argue that the
1993 Constitution had been tailored to the persona of Boris Yeltsin. Liha Shevtsova, for
instance, contends that the constitutional framework had been designed to "ensure
domination" by Boris Yeltsin and his close entourage. The personal characteristics of
Boris Yeltsin seemed conspicuously close to this rationale. That Yeltsin had an obvious
weakness for presenting himself as the new Czar and the single pohtical force able to
protect democracy in the Russian lands underscores this rationale. To notice Lilia
Huskey, 1999, p.l70.
’’ The most recent impeachment procedure was instituted on 15 April 1999. One of the five counts
of impeachment included the charge that Yeltsin was to be held responsible for the shelling of the White
House in 1993. This is the most notorious charge leveled against Yeltsin in subsequent indictments
generally promoted by the Communist Party. None of the charges, however, passed the first hurdle in the
State Duma to get the required 300 votes. For details see The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press,
Vol.51,No.20,pp.l-5.
Shevtsova, 1999, p.279.
71
Shevtsova: Yeltsin's tremendous power - and, equally important, the influence of his
circle - have accentuated some of his undemocratic characteristics. Those close to him
have often encouraged him to think of himself as Czar Boris (1999, p.275)."^^ As a
corollary, he may have perceived any restriction on his presidential powers as an insult.
Parliamentary efforts to amend the Constitution were repudiated on a routine basis. To be
sure, any type of amendment would impair his capacity to act as the patron of Russian
democracy. To quote Boris Yeltsin directly: "The Constitution is what enables us to
block extremists. It stands in the way of those who are sowing hatred and ethnic discord,
who cannot abide a free press, and who are trying to deny us the right to private
ownership and a free market." Boris Yeltsin considered it as politically expedient to
maintain the extensive powers of the presidency in order to defend newly established
freedoms. The Russian transition has in this respect been marked by the use of traditional
patterns of political authority. Indicative of the implied personalism, however, is the fact
that everything depended on his persona of being the President. Yeltsin resisted
amendments because he apparently considered his own personahty to be the central
safeguard of Russian democracy. For obvious reasons, political analysis, therefore, tends
to label the 1993 framework as the "Yeltsin Constitution." By the same token, what
Shevtsova, 1999, p.275.
Obviously, the bones of contention were parliamentary efforts to amend the constitution. State
Duma deputies, stirred up by the recurrent government reshuffles, sought to amend the constitution in order
to delimit the powers of the Presidency. Yelena Mizulina (Yabloko), for instance, launched an initiative in
July 1998, wherein she proposed to simplify the procedure for impeaching the President. For details, see
Sergei Aksyonov. "State Duma Storms Constitution," Kommersant-Daily, July 1, 1998, p.3, as translated in
The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press, Vol.50, No.26, p.l 1.
Natalya Timakova. "Don't Hold Your Breath," Kommersant, December 15, 1998, pp.lf, as
translated in The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press, Vol.50, No.50, p.l4f.
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Yeltsin did not account for is the fact that the constitutional framework could provide a
Trojan horse for dictatorial ambitions. This scenario could become especially relevant if a
member of an extremist" party should win the presidential elections. In such a
circumstance, the Constitution would deliver the means necessary to roll back reform by
decree. Yeltsin s grasp of the situation reveals that he was very positive about himself to
act as the President.
Action Channels
The ability of the presidency to generate support for his legislative agenda in the
State Duma has been further advanced by a network of bureaucratic support structures.
Eugene Huskey accounts in this respect for three action channels that became regularly
employed by the President. The first is the Domestic Policy Administration, which
informs the President of the correlation of political forces in Parliament while at the same
time trying to convince deputies of the advantages of the legislative initiatives of the
president. The second institution comprises the presidential representatives to the Duma
and Federation Council. These operational units oversee the movement of a bill from its
drafting in the executive to its final approval in Parliament. In addition, for important
bills, the leader of the Executive Office of the President also assigns a high-ranking
government official to "bulldog" the bill through the two houses.
The most crucial institutional support is delivered by the Executive Office
assisting the President to manage the flow of legal documents in and out of his office.
Huskey, 1999, pp.l72f.
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Established in 1993, the Executive Office brings under one organizational roof a
disparate group of presidential agencies, ranging from the State-Legal Administration and
Monitoring Administration to the analytical centers serving at the discretion of the
President. Huskey indicates that the organizational structure of the Executive Office
defies a clear demarcation in the lines of competency. Accordingly, it is stated that the
Executive Office never succeeded in establishing clear vertical lines of authority or
horizontal lines of jurisdiction between offices.^®^ In addition, its many subdivisions
enjoy different degrees of autonomy and access to the President. As a result, the
Executive Office developed into a massive institution with forty-three bureaus and two
thousand professional staff members. Of great significance for legislative procedure is the
State-Legal Administration that advises the President on legal matters. It functions as a
key gatekeeper in the legislative process, whether shepherding executive bills through
Parliament, advising the President on the appropriate response to legislative vetoes, or
drafting and reviewing decrees for the President's signature.
The Presidency, patterned upon traditional concepts of legal authority, presents
itself as the dominant player within the Russian political realm endowed with the
discretion to affect policy design and to outmaneuver parliamentary opposition. With the
aid of an expansive support apparatus, the President has a wide range of options to
influence policy choice. Such an arrangement seems troublesome with regard to aspects
of institution-building and capacity.
For details, see Huskey, 1999, pp.58ff.
For a detailed discussion of the State-Legal Administration, see Huskey, Eugene. 1995.
The
State-Legal Administration and the Politics of Redundancy," Post-Soviet Affairs, Vol.l 1, No.2,
pp.l 15-143.
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Interface Linkages
Access to "Czar Boris": Societal schemes of participation tend to follow the
culturally embedded modus operand!. The analysis refers in this context to the delicate
web of 'court politics" and extra-constitutional arrangements that revolved around the
Yeltsin family. In its pursuit of reform politics, the Yeltsin Presidency appeared to
capitalize on a personalized type of entitlement that corresponds in this regard to features
of volatility and procedural inequality. To provide a systemic account of the issue,
however, requires some improvisation, since emerging patterns of bargaining and
participation in policy design continue to be a work in progress. The absence of an
institutionalized input structure may in this respect render only the most general
pattern.
A politicized account of the Yeltsin regime was tendered by former Prime Minster
Yevgeny Primakov. In an open letter to the President, Primakov criticized a lack of
concern on the part of the presidential apparatus for the affairs of society, to wit:
We feel compelled to write to you because we are seriously concerned about the state of affairs in
Russia on the eve of the parliamentary and presidential elections. [...] The presidential staff and a
group of individuals close to it have essentially been put in charge of the country, and this group is
turning the state into a hostage to its interests and actions, while your political and informational
isolation from the people who elected you is increasing. The Russian Federation government
sometimes becomes a mere game piece- in your inner circle's games.
To be sure, volatility of input options is likely to continue for some time since the societal bases
of civil society are still underdeveloped; see, for instance, M. Steven Fish, Democracyfrom Scratch, 1995;
for studies on entrepreneurial organizations see Lohr, Eric. 1993. "Arkady Volksy's Political Base,"
Europe-Asia Studies, Vol.45, No. 5, pp.818-837; McFaul, Michael. 1993. "Russian Centrism and
Revolutionary Transition," Post-Soviet Affairs, Vol.9, No.3, July-September, pp. 196-223; Rudkin, Charles.
1996. "The Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs: Professional Association or Political Party?
The Role of Employers' Associations in Post-Soviet Russia," Slavonic and East European Review, Vol.74,
No.4, pp.640-657.
"A Small Group of Individuals Is Abusing its Position," Letter from Primakov, Luzhkov and
Yakovlev to the President of Russia. Kommersant, Oct.29, 1999, p.2, as translated in The Current Digest of
the Post-Soviet Press, Vol.51, No.43, p.l4.
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The underlying pretext of the open letter was the deteriorating health condition of the
President and the pressing question of who would eventually replace him. The political
nature of the letter may in this regard explicate the conspiracy theory involved, namely
the allegation that "the state" has been turned into a "hostage." At a more general level,
the letter is indicative of the problem of insularity and the formation of particularistic
exchange relations.
More carefully crafted assessments of the Russian political situation confirm the
latter point. Hans-Henning Schroder, for instance, argues that;
Proximity of financial and business circles to the executive and intertwining with the institutions
relevant for making decisions was characteristic of the [Yeltsinite, W.T.] political system. Parties,
associations or lobbies representing the will of large groups of society and giving these a political
voice were still underdeveloped. Thus, society as a whole was excluded from the political process.
[...] Consequently, it was not the consolidation of democracy that was the central focus of the
political process in Russia but the deformation of the presidential democracy legitimated by
elections and the constitution by incorporating commercial interests into the actions of the
executive.'®’
The New Kremhn Ohgarchy. The group of individuals and business circles with
high proximity to the Yeltsin Presidency came to be known as the "Oligarchy" or the
"Boyars." Informal entitlement schemes are endemic features of this particular kind of
Schroder, Hans-Henning. 1999. "El’tsin and the Oligarchs: The Role of Financial Groups in
Russian Politics Between 1993 and July 1998," Europe-Asia Studies, Vol.51, No.6, pp.957-988, here at
pp.980f.
The group of "boyars" includes Boris Berezovsky of LogoVaz (automobiles, television, oil);
Roman Abramovich of Sibneft (protege of Berezovsky), Mikhail Friedman of the Alfa Group (oil, tea,
sugar, cement); Mikhail Khodorkovsky of Ros-Prom (banking, oil); Vladimir Gusinsky of Media-Most
Group (television, newspapers, banking, real estate); Mikhail Smolensky of SBS-Agro (banking), Vladimir
Potanin of Uneximbank (banking, real estate, oil and gas, media, ferrous metals); Vladimir Vinogradov of
Inkombank (banking, metals, oil).
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exchange relationship. The Yeltsin regime was actively involved in the creation of this
type of support group.
An essential contribution to the emergence of oligarchic structures occurred when
the Kremlin turned over state budget money for commercial management. After the
collapse of the Soviet Union the existing financial structures had to be rejuvenated
without, however, disrupting the established networks. With the backing of the political
leadership, new private banks" mushroomed with state-provided capitalization.**^ In
turn, the newly emerging banking elite would eventually proceed to utilize their resources
to buy up Russian industry. A very effective tool was, in this respect, the so-called loans-
for-shares privatization scheme. Masterminded by Potanin, the scheme advocated that
large stakes in Russia's companies were to be transferred to a small group of bankers on
highly favorable terms. Yeltsin instituted this privatization scheme in 1995, whereby the
class of nouveaux riches businessmen agreed to make loans to the "cash-starved" state in
return for shares. Most transactions were the result of behind-closed-doors negotiations.
The rationale underlying this reform strategy was to create a class of property
owners whose self-interest would depend on the continued support of the Yeltsin regime.
To secure support for his reform policies President Yeltsin granted special "exemptions"
Its emergence has been described as comprising three stages: commercial, banking, and
industrial. See Sergei Markov. "Big Money's Origins: The Three Stages," Izvestia, Sept. 18, 1997, p.4, as
translated in The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press, Vol.49, No.38, p.9f. See also Virginie
Coulloudon. 2000. "The Divided Russian Elite: How Russia's Transition Produced a Counter-Elite," in
Building the Russian State, pp.67-87; Olga Krishtanovskaia and Stephen White. 1999. "From
Nomenklatura to New Elite," in The New Elite in Post-Communist Eastern Europe, pp.27-52; Ivan
Kukolev. 1999. "Formation of the Business Elite in Russia," in The New Elite in Post-Communist Eastern
Europe, pp.279-295.
For details, see Coulloudon, 2000, pp.69ff.
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in exchange for loyalty. To make social and economic reforms irreversible Yeltsin was
pleased to give out bargains to friendly bankers rather than to the provincial industrialists
who are backing the Communist Party. Culturally specified codes of governance emerge
in this respect through the personalized nature of entitlement. To some political
observers, analogies to the late czarist period "fit perfectly well" in this context.'"
Violent Entrepreneurship. Certain institutional details of the political exchange
situation, however, call into question its cultural modus. Conspicuous in this regard is the
attitudinal orientation of some of the financial-industrial elite vis-a-vis political authority
and their seeming readiness to exploit every means possible, including extra-
constitutional arrangements, to advance their agenda of self-enrichment. As a corollary,
conflicts of interest often bear the imprints of violent entrepreneurship. Government
officials opposed to oligarchic business interests ran the risk of becoming targets of
organized violence.
Anatoly Chubais and Boris Nemtsov, two key figures of the "second-generation
reforms" [see below, IMF], illustrate the violent tendencies of the post-Soviet political
exchange situation. Appointed Deputy Prime Ministers in March 1997, the reformers
were tasked to break with the unwritten rules of behind-the-scenes agreements. Part of the
new strategy was to make sure that state assets would be privatized within a framework of
(relatively) open and competitive bids. The first touchstone of this type of government
action was the competitive bid for 25% shares of Svyazinvest (Communications Invest
Telecommunications Company) on 25 July 1997. At the auction itself, two consortia were
See, for example, Dinello, Natalia. 1999. "The Russian F-Connection. Finance, Firms, Friends,
Families, and Favorites," Problems ofPost-Communism. January/February, pp.24-33.
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competing, whereby the Mustcom holding (Potanin interest) emerged as the winner
defeating his competitor, Berezovsky. Expectedly, the auction was surrounded by
incidents of moderately belligerent exchanges. In a last-minute appeal to Chubais,
Berezovsky reportedly tried hard to avert the scenario of open competition.'*^ To this
end, Berezovsky, in company with Potanin and Gusinsky, boarded a plane to meet
Chubais who was vacationing in France at the time. However, in opposition to their
demands, Chubais upheld the cause of the official agenda. Dissatisfied with the formula
that whoever should offer the largest amount would win, Gusinsky and Berezovsky
reportedly went over to threaten Chubais with "media war." Another ploy of the
Oligarchs was the possibility of taking purposeful actions to bring about the collapse of
Svyazinvest. In the aftermath of the bid, the defeated competitors made real their first
threat and initiated a large-scale media campaign against Chubais. Multiple "conspiracy
theories" were aired involving an allegedly "strategic alliance" between Chubais, Kokh
(Deputy Prime Minister and Chairman of the State Property Committee), and Potanin to
outmaneuver the recalcitrant tycoons. In the end, Yeltsin eventually stepped in and
fired Kokh as "compensation" for those who lost in the auction. In addition, Yeltsin
promised that ONEKSIMbank would not participate in the next Svyazinvest auction.
"^Andrei Bagrov. "Owners of ORT and NTV Lose First Battle," Kommersant-Daily, July 30,
1997, pp.lf, as translated in The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press, Vol.49, No.30, p.5.
For a detailed organizational chart see "Who Controls Russia's News Media Outlets,"
Sevodnya, August 12, 1999, p.2, as translated in The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press, Vol.51,
No.33,p.l4.
See, for instance, Ulyan Kerzonov. "Anatoly Chubais Seeks Complete Control Over Russia,"
Nezavismaya Gazeta (Berezovsky interest). Sept. 13, 1997, pp.1-6, as translated in The Current Digest of
the Post-Soviet Press, Vol.49, No.37, pp.1-5; Fyodor Fyodorov. "Bankers Behind Kremlin Walls,"
Kommerant-Daily, Sept. 16, 1997, p.l, as translated in The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press, Vol.49,
No.37, p.5.
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Another case demonstrating the violent tendencies of the new Oligarchy is
provided by the Skuratov affair, in Spring of 1999. At that the time the Prosecutor
General, Skuratov was ousted from office while he was looking into illegal financial
transactions involving Aeroflot. The events leading to his dismissal became virulent when
state-run television channels aired excerpts of videotape purporting to show Skuratov
engaging in an extra-marital affair. According to Skuratov’s understanding, the chain of
events leading to the broadcasting of the tape is connected to the very circle of personages
that he was investigating. In his statement to the Federation Council on 17 March 1999,
he indicated that: "A big contribution to the process of getting me out of office was made
by the oligarchs you are all familiar with, who have their own interest in criminal cases
involving corruption in the highest echelons of power. The cases they are most interested
in are the ones involving the Aeroflot airline company [Berezovsky interest], the
AvtoVAZ [Volga Automotive Plant] joint-stock company, the Atoll private security
company [Berezovsky involvement] and others."
The more immediate circumstances surrounding the Skuratov-affair, however,
reveal the uncompromising nature of the tactics of the new Kremlin Oligarchy. In the
pursuit of wealth and political influence, the new class of businessmen seems inchned to
utilize forward linkages to crime and corruption. To acquire incriminating evidence, the
Speech of the General Prosecutor in the Federation Council reprinted in Kommersant, March
18, 1999, p.6, as translated in The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press, Vol.51, No.l 1, p.lf.
Investigations into the cash flows of Aeroflot have indicated that moneys from ticket sales were channeled
to an off-shore bank via complicate financial schemes involving the subsidiary Andava located in Lausanne,
Switzerland {Der Spiegel, 1999, No.35, p.l44f.). The Atoll company is charged to have carried out private
surveillance activities on high-ranking government officials including the Russian President s family. See
Leonid Berres and Oleg Stulov. "Search is made at Sibneft for incriminating evidence against Berezovsky,"
Kommersant, Feb.3, 1999, p.l, as translated in The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press, Vol.51, No.5,
p.7.
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new Oligarchy, as a corollary, obviously capitalizes on the prevailing situation of
dysfunctional administrative state capacity.
The most distinguishing thing about oligarchic capitalism is the "privatization of power." I know of
a great many examples in which, at the wave of some magnate's hand, an army of regular
policemen and prosecutors will begin working feverishly to dig up dirt on that magnate's rival or
political opponent. Our law-enforcement agencies are so weak and impoverished that they are in
effect at the disposal not of bodies of power but of economic and media "kings." Investigations of
high-profile contract murder proceed slowly and listlessly. But when it comes to a competitive
struggle among businessmen, dozens of investigators go to work, turning everything upside down
to satisfy some magnate's curiosity.^
Chronic problems of underpayment in the administrative apparatus have the effect that
law enforcement agents exchange their official duties with private protection money on
an informal basis. It has been estimated that up to 20% of FSB (former KGB) cadres are
engaged in extra-legal "roof (krysha) business.^ In his detailed analysis of various
agencies of violent entrepreneurship, Volkov demonstrates that there is a growing
industry of private enforcers that recruits its personnel from the power-wielding
administrative branches of government, MVD and FSB.^^* Private security agencies are
said to build "enforcement partnerships" at times with semi-legal entities or
straightforward criminal groups. Criminal groups and state police cooperate to install a
"combined roof." As a corollary, corrupt officials "reveal" violations of sanitary and other
Boris Nemtsov. "Russia’s Future. - Oligarchy or Democracy?" Nezavisimaya gazeta, March
17, 1998, p.8, as translated in The Current Digest, Vo.50, No.l 1, pp.1-5. See also, "I'm against a board of
directors for Russia." Interview with Anatoly Chubais conducted by Yevgenia Albats, Kommersant-Daily,
March 5, 1998, pp.1-5, as translated in The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press, Vol.50, No.l 1, pp.6-8.
The Economist (28 August, 1999, p.l7) characterizes Krysha as a "straightforward commercial
arrangement, with payments, which may typically run to 10-20% of profits, invoiced monthly by a security
company. The resulting protection is a hybrid of insurance, factoring, physical security, a lawyer and a
friendly civil servant: good service costs more, but is more effective."
Vadim Volkov. 1999. "Violent Entrepreneurship in Post-Communist Russia," Europe-Asia
Studies, Vol.51, No.5, p.74 1-754.
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codes on order from the Mafia. Entrepreneurial entities without "roof protection then
face up to exorbitant taxes or inspection fees and the like. The joint enterprise of violent
entrepreneurship, however, has furthered the hollowing out of the state’s claim that it
represents the legitimate monopoly of power. By exploiting and maintaining a vacuum,
semi-legal collusion between corrupt officialdom, state police, and criminal groups have
compromised any serious effort toward state-building.
In view of such violent aspects in state-business relations, it seems unlikely that
the post-Soviet banking and corporate elite would fit "perfectly" well in the Romanov
model of governance. Particularly troublesome in this respect has been the readiness of
the financial-industrial elite to exploit almost every means possible to advance their
agenda of self-enrichment, including the utihzation of forward hnkages to violent
entrepreneurship. Confronted with these semi-legal aspects of Russian entrepreneurship,
it seems futile to expect the new Oligarchy to proffer input for the legal conceptualization
of the company. Au contraire, the situation suggests that the financial-industrial elite
continues to identify and pursue its interests outside the conventional rule-of-law
framework. Certainly, the sanctity-of-law concept that penetrates much of the Western
business climate is alien to this kind of support group.
IMF-Cooperation. Another essential case demonstrating the institutional
contingencies of the Yeltsin regime was MF-Russian cooperation. The analysis
emphasizes in this respect the proximity of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to
relevant Russian policy-making authorities. Whether this kind of cooperation evolved
into a case of "intertwining" remains open to discussion since disagreement prevails
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concerning the depth of IMF involvement in Russian affairs. Political inquiries vacillate
in this regard between notions of technical assistance and political advocacy.
In the field of privatization, Aslund, for instance, argues that the role of foreign
advisors was simply to provide technical support. As Aslund put it: "...the leading
Russian privatizers, Chubais and his deputy Dmitry Vasiliev, knew what kind of policy
they wanted. They instructed their advisors about the policy framework, and the advisors
were not permitted to act as an interest group. Their job was to provide the government
with useful advice within the parameters of the government policy."'^” Political studies,
on the other hand, contend that the international institution, beyond its conventional task
of macro-economic stabilization, got increasingly involved into the management of the
Russian economy. To be sure, a possible source for these diverging assessments is low
visibility in IMF operations.
IMF proximity, however, was conspicuous when the Yeltsin Presidency took the
initiative to apply for full membership in the international institution. To expedite the
application, the Russian government invited foreign advice to participate in the drafting
of a detailed program on economic policy. The resulting framework conformed so well to
IMF standards that it would eventually earn the grade of "an IMF shadow program
without financing" from one of the foreign advisors. Approved in late February 1992,
Aslund, Anders. 1995. How Russia Became a Market Economy. Washington, DC: The
Brookings Institution.
Aslund, 1995, p.248.
See, for instance, Gould-Davis, Nigel & Ngaire Woods. 1999. "Russia and the IMF,
International Affairs, Vol.75, No.l, pp.1-22.
Aslund, 1995, p.64.
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the Economic Memorandum was sent to the Fund in the hope it would expedite their
apphcation for full membership. Russian Government circles expressed their hope that
the document "will make a good impression on the international economic community
and that Russia will become a full member of the IMF and the International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development [The World Bank]."^^^
Evidently, the Russian government pinned high hopes on IMF membership.
Endemic to this episode was the idea that transition to a democratic market economy
would essentially hinge upon the availability of foreign financial assistance. According
to this reform calculus, it became imperative to know what kind of pohcy would meet the
sympathies of the international finance community. The Russian government would
therefore invite foreign economic advice to participate in the drafting of the economic
reform agenda to ensure agreement with western standards. The official presentation of
the Memorandum bespeaks the delicate nature of IMF involvement. Speaking at the 1992
Annual Meeting of the Bretton Woods Committee, Michel Camdessus, at the time IMF
Managing Director, was obviously taking pains to de-emphasize IMF involvement in the
drafting. "The staff of the IMF has assisted the Russian authorities in preparing this
memorandum. But allow me to insist on one point. It is their program. They will take the
credit for the successes and the blame for the failures." He then went on to explain: "The
"Russian Government Memorandum on Economic Policy," Izvestia, February 28, 1992, pp.1-2,
as translated in The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press, Vol.44, No.9, pp.1-4.
Gould-Davis et al. (1999) refer in this respect to the structure of incentives deriving from IMF
assistance. IMF credits, it is noticed, provide an inexpensive modus to finance the state budget by non-
inflationary means. In addition, the institution's influence is highly leveraged since successful negotiations
v^th the IMF are almost always a prerequisite for agreements with the World Bank, the London Club and
the Paris Club.
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program has to be their program, backed by their commitment, supported by their public
opinion."
Visibility of IMF proximity emerged aggressively (though not by intentional
design) when the institution announced its support for "second-generation" reforms in
1995. The ultimate intent was to strengthen property rights by making financial support
conditional upon thorough institutional changes. To achieve this, the IMF put a new slant
on conditionality. To strengthen its commitment towards second generation reforms,
the Russian government entered into special monitoring agreements with the Fund.
Monitoring of standby arrangements was to be conducted on a monthly rather than
quarterly basis. A related strategy was to institute a Temporary Extraordinary
Commission on Strengthening Tax and Budget Discipline [VChK]. Under the aegis of
Anatoly Chubais and Boris Nemtsov, the Commission was empowered to seize and sell
off the assets of tax debtors. Such actions, and IMF support for them, provoked a furious
response from the Oligarchs.
In December 1997, when the Commission decided to seize and subsequently sell
off the property of two tax defaulters - the Omsk Petroleum Refinery (Berezosky) and
the Angarsk Petro-chemicals Company — a new tide of "media war" erupted. To oppose
strengthened efforts of revenue collection, the financial-industrial elite decided to
orchestrate a media campaign against IMF involvement in Russian business affairs. The
Michel Camdessus speaking to the Conference on the Economic Future of the Former Soviet
Union at the 1992 Annual Meeting of the Bretton Woods Committee, U.S. Department of State,
Washington, D.C. on June 15, reprinted in IMF Survey, 6 July 1992, p.221.
For details see Gould-Davis et al., 1999, pp.l Iff.
IMF Press Release No. 95/21, 1 1 April 1995.
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most cynical articles came from the Berezovsky-owned newspaper Nezavisimaya gazeta.
Its first page headline read: "Why Does Russia Need a Government of its Own?"*^*
Excerpts of letters from IMF and World Bank to the Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin
were published, which convey the clear message that the Russian government would not
obtain any further assistance unless Chernomyrdin would "finalize" the decisions of the
VChK. Nezavisimaya gazeta commented on the IMFAVorldbank initiative, to wit:
"Following the IMF's logic, the Russian Federation Cabinet of Ministers could be
disbanded, it could be replaced by a small staff for monitoring the implementation of
Washington s decisions, and the [Russian] White House could be leased to commercial
firms. Everything would be easier for the budget." CapitaUzing on the theme of wounded
national pride, the authors eventually went over to ridicule Chubais and Nemtsov who
conducted the VChK campaign. Koshkciryova and Narzikulov made their view clear:
"Under this arrangement, there would no longer be any need for the two First Deputy
Prime Ministers, who deal with the economy. After all, they are essentially duphcating
the work of Messrs. Camdessus and Wolfensohn."^^^
To be sure, Russia's new relationship with the IMF was made possible in part by
the strong insulated executive, which had been created by the 1993 constitution. During
Koshkaryova, Tatyana & Rustam Narzikulov. "Why Does Russia Need a Government of its
Own?" Nezavisimaya gazeta, Dec.18, 1997, pp.lf, as translated in The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet
Press, Vol.49, No.51, pp.8f.
Camdessus is quoted to "recommend" that: "Before the meeting of the Board of Executive
Directors can be held, a number of measures in the form of preliminary conditions must be carried out. [...]
I attach enormous significance to the decisions made at the VChK's meeting on Dec. 8, 1997, concerning
major defaulter enterprises. Those decisions are especially important if the government intends to show
major Russian taxpayers that it is serious about its efforts to collect taxes. Accordingly, the decisions should
be finalized immediately, made public, and then implemented fully, following a specific timetable.
Ibid.
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the course of negotiations, IMF-staff could reassure itself of the feasibility of agreed-upon
terms of contract since the Russian Presidency could make them legally effective by
resorting to its abundant decree powers. Parliamentary opposition to IMF conditionality,
on the other hand, could be simply vetoed. The elitist and essentially collusive nature of
such "cooperation" sparked criticism regarding the role of IMF-sponsored economic
advice, not only from among the ranks of the Oligarchy but from the academic
community as well. It is criticized that economic advisors, operating on neo-classical
theoretical basis, are welcoming the concentration of political power, while ignoring the
long-term effects of such approach on capacity-building, and the concept of democratic
legitimacy in particular.
Assessing IMF staff involvement in Russian legal reform, Kathryn Hendley comes
to the conclusion that:
Many laws related to economic development, such as banking and securities legislation, have been
demanded not by Russian businessmen but by international financial institutions. In some
instances, the release of money from the World Bank or the International Monetary Fund has been
linked to the passage of specific laws (Camdessus, 1996). In other cases, receiving technical
assistance for much-needed reforms has required the Russians indiscriminately to adopt a Western
framework for these reforms, rather them allowing Russian practice to dictate the shape of future
institutions (Aslund, 1995, p.247; Sharlet, 1997).'^^
See, also. Fish (2000, p.181), who argues that;
"For their own part, the foreign consultemts who advised the Russian government on economics
were, as is normally the case among neoclassical economists, convinced of the virtues of concentrating,
rather than dispersing, power. Many felt that the concentration of power would fortify the forces most
committed to rapid economic change, minimize the dangers of 'gridlock,' and marginalize the bothersome
interference of 'politics' in restructuring a moribund economy."
Hendley, Kathryn. 1997. "Legal Development in Post-Soviet Russia," Post-Soviet Affairs,
Vol.l3, No.3, pp. 228-251, here at pp.238-240.
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Corporate Law Reform. 1992 - 1996
The process of corporate law reform confirms the outlined contingencies of
transformative state capacity. The analysis confronts in this respect the circumstance that
the Yeltsin regime was able to engender popular support for the removal of Soviet-type
controls, as mandated by the reform concept of "depoliticization," without, however,
securing intermediary agreements on the emerging legal framework.^” The principle
objective of Russian privatization, as Shleifer and Vasiliev summed it up, was not to get
rid of the managers, but of the ministries. The inabihty of the Yeltsin regime to
effectively move its reform agenda beyond the strategy of depoliticization so as to design
and implement a cohesive corporate governance regime is indicative of the proposed line
of reasoning.
Underlying reform failure was the predisposition of the Yeltsin Presidency to
utilize various types of emergency powers. Instead of going through a lengthy process of
building societal support, the Presidency would more often resort to Article 90 in order to
circumvent parliamentary opposition to his reform plans. Using his decree powers,
Yeltsin issued omnibus privatization decrees that would include aspects of company
Depoliticization, as argued by Boycko, Shleifer, and Vishny (1996) refers to the reform strategy
of disenfranchising Soviet-type controls over the affairs of business and industrial management. To
implement depoliticization was considered imperative according to dominant types of economic advice
since political influence over business was considered the prime cause for economic inefficiency.
Institutional concerns of effective corporate governance, on the other hand, and managerial discretion in
particular, were considered "clearly subordinate" to depoliticization (Boycko et al., 1996, p.l2). The main
policy tool of depoliticization was the 1992 Privatization Program. Signed into law by Yeltsin on 1 1 June
1992, the Russian parliament passed a new privatization program designed to distribute most of the large
state enterprises in eighteen months, beginning in January 1993.
Andrei Shleifer and Dimitry Vasiliev. 1996. "Management Ownership and Russian
Privatization," in Corporate Governance in Central Europe and Russia. Vol.2, pp.62-77.
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law. In addition, regulations related to corporate law materialized in the manner of flat
orders or prohibitions: the President states what is or what is not to be done. As a
corollary, the privatization decrees were typically lengthy, making it difficult to locate the
relevant provisions. The pertaining contingencies of the legal conceptualization of the
firm became clearly visible for Pistor who observes that:
From a formal point of view it is worth noting that most normative acts pertaining to privatization
or corporate law, issued since the introduction of economic reforms in 1992, were presidential
decrees. Their primary goal was to regulate specific aspects of the reform process, without being
necessarily consistent with each other, or with underlying legislation. The latter is part of the basic
dilemma of the reform process. Even if the legislature had been willing to support reform, it would
have been unable to keep up with its pace. As a result, contradictions between new normative acts
and old laws would have been unavoidable under more favorable conditions. [...] The lack of
change in legal culture is also apparent in the style of normative acts passed. The majority of
norms reveal a systemic lack of appreciation of the importance of norm clarity and consistency.
This tendency is difficult to explain, unless it is seen as the continuation of a legal culture that paid
little attention to a rational and predictable legal system.*^^
Kathryn Hendley, a distinguished field researcher of Russian company law, renders a
similar account:
The technical problems of Russian law (including company law) are legion. Merely finding the law
can be a struggle - to say nothing of the difficulty of interpretation. Laws are often internally
contradictory or make cross-references to laws that either do not yet exist or do not say what the
first law claims. The desire to make the market reforms irreversible has led to impatience with the
long debates within the legislature, and to a preference for executive decrees.
Deficiencies in norm consistency were eventually to compromise the reform agenda by
erecting entry barriers to outside shareholders. Due to the 1992 privatization regime,
Russian management disposed over a veto over corporate entry. As Joseph Blasi
For details, see Pistor, Katharina. 1997. "Company Law and Corporate Governance in
Russia,"
in The Rule ofLaw and Economic Reform in Russia, pp. 165- 187.
Pistor, 1997,pp.l75f.
Hendley & Gray, 1997, p.l50.
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observed: "When the enterprises were privatized, the proof of share ownership was not a
share certificate but the record of the owner's name in an official book called the
shareholder register. If your name was not there, you did not own stock. Period."'^* Thus,
if an investor wanted to start accumulating shares of a particular company, the general
director could make these intentions null and void by simply refusing to register new
shareholders or not disclosing relevant information to interested parties. In addition, an
employee who wanted to sell his own shares had to get management's approval before the
transaction could be registered.
Interim Period
During the interim period (1992-1996), incremental changes were made in
company law whereby attention was largely focused on privatization (Order No. 255 and
No. 2004). Despite these initiatives, the tendency for most shareholder registries to be
"closely held secrets" continued. The majority of company managers were reported to
have been very reluctant to relinquish their control on shareholder registers, which further
compromised the free selling and buying of shares. Preventing workers from selling,
refusing or delaying registration of shares acquired by new owners, or erasing
shareholders from the company register, were frequently reported.
Blasi, Joseph R., Maya Kroumova, and Douglas Kruse. 1997. Kremlin Capitalism: The
Privatization of the Russian Economy. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, here at p.90.
Ibid.
Thirty-six percent of voucher funds surveyed in the summer of 1994 report that a major
obstacle to share acquisitions on the secondary market is that shares are not registered, see Frydman et al.
(1996) Moreover, the establishment of shareholder registries has often been delayed. For
example,
Gazprom completed voucher auction at the end of June 1994. By December 1994 the company had
still not
established its shareholder register; see Pistor, 1997, p.l73.
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In response to such malpractice, a Presidential Decree of October 1993 (Decree
No. 1768, 27 October 1993) sought to address the problem. The decree stipulated in
detail the requirements for registering shares and for providing that the refusal to register,
despite the fact that all necessary documents were submitted, could be challenged by
referring to the company's revision commission or filing a law suit. In addition,
companies with more than 1 ,000 shareholders were required to transfer their register to a
bank, investment company, or similar organization.
A 1995 survey of 3,400 of Russia's largest companies, however, revealed that 44
percent of the companies with more than 1,000 shareholders had not surrendered control
over their shareholder registers.^"^^ Moreover, these companies controlled many of the
broker or financing houses conducting shareholder registers on behalf of companies.
Additional entry barriers to outside ownership arose from the extensive catalog of
administrative requirements. In order to transfer shares, companies usually required a
complex set of documentation to be filed, which in turn needed to be certified by a
specially authorized firm with notary powers. Other requirements included, but were not
limited to, the presentation of a formal application by the new shareholder to open an
account, powers of attorney by the seller or buyer, as well as proof that taxes were paid on
the transaction.
The survey was conducted by the "Gruppa monitoringy fondovogo rynka (GMFR) attached to
the Russian Securities Commission (KZB), see Kommersant No.7, 28 February 1995, p.42, as quoted in
Pistor, 1997, p.l73.
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The 1996 Company Law
A more comprehensive approach developed only with the new Civil Code and the
new Law on Joint-Stock Companies. On 24 November 1995, the Russian Duma adopted
the Law on Stock Companies that was put in force as of 1 January 1996, making it the
first comprehensive company law in Russia's history. The law replaces most of the
patchwork legal regulations on corporate law that had been enacted during the
privatization process.^'^^ President Yeltsin, wary of the significance of the legal reform
initiative, obviously did not utilize Article 90 to fashion policy. Government officials
expressly resisted the "temptation" to put its main points into force by presidential
decree.^'^^ Its drafting extended over the (likely) period of two years (1993-1995).
Societal Input. Even though available data on bargaining is limited, it appears that
regionally based groups and Soviet-type organizations tried to influence policy design. In
the end, the governmental proposed framework, however, should prevail over somewhat
fragmented domestic group pressures.
Provincial groups, for instance, are reported to have lobbied in favor of extending
the privileges of closed-type companies. Certainly, the continuation of this governance
type would have played in the hands of insider domination by effectively barring outside
The first part of the Civil Code (Sobranie zaknodatel'stva RF, no. 32, art. 3301, 1994) came
into effect in January 1995. The second part of the Civil Code {Sobranie zaknodatel'stva RF, no.5, art. 410,
1996) came into effect in March 1996.
Karpenko, Igor. "Law for Stockholders," Izvestia, March 30, 1994, p.4, as translated in The
Current Digest ofPost-Soviet Press, Vol.46, No.l3, p.l5f. The article implicitly refers to First Vice-
Chairman of the State Property Committee Pyotr Mostovoi as having been well aware of the importance not
to use presidential decree powers for the enactment of the law.
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ownership.^^ The government draft, on the other hand, proposed limiting the number of
participants m closed-type joint-stock companies in order to extend the legal basis for
investment and technology transfer. Within the final stages of the drafting process the
region-based group demands would eventually acquiesce into government policy. Notice
is taken that: "In the end, everyone agreed with the government that the number of
stockholders in a closed-type company should be limited...''^'^^
Despite such spontaneous cases of policy alignment, it would be wrong to believe
that governmental discretion in designing policy was beyond reproach. To be sure,
government officials would have to deal with the likely opposition of Soviet-type
collectivities. Available data suggests that concessions were made regarding policy
pressures from communist-based and agrarian organizations.*'^^
Agrarian groups reportedly lobbied for special arrangements regarding the legal
status of recently reorganized state and collective farms. Positioning themselves as "the
most opposition-minded group," agricultural producers were looking for amendments that
would allow them continued state funding. Apparently, their voices had been heard. The
final draft eventually extended special jurisdiction for agricultural entities without,
however, encroaching upon the main principles of corporate law reform. Similar
Ivanov, Viktor & Boris Boiko. "Saga of the Law on Joint-Stock Companies Has Come to an
End," Kommersant-Daily, November 25, 1995, p.2, as translated in The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet
Press, Vol.47, No.47, p.20. The article lists the Voronezh Province Duma as the official protagonist of this
type of demand. The authors, furthermore, refer to the vested interests of the regional military-industrial
complex.
Ibid.
See supra note; see also Natalya Samoilova. "Privatization of State Property: State Duma
Tightens Control. But Cautiously," Kommersant-Daily, July 6, 1995, p.2, as translated in The Current
Digest of the Post-Soviet Press, Vol.47, No.27, p.l4.
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tendencies prevailed regarding communist-based demands that sought to make
amendments regarding issues of authorized charter capital. Encountering opposition on
this issue, the government dropped the idea of introducing the principle of "fund balance"
(i.e. assets minus liabilities) as advocated by western standards.
Thus, even though available data is suggestive of societal resistance, it should be
noted that the particularistic nature of politically articulated interests would not amount to
a broad-based opposition to government policy. Instead, their main concern was to
demand exemptions to the rule, not to establish a coherent policy alternative. Indicative of
state autonomy is the circumstance that legal output would conform to the principled
purpose of reform, namely to introduce a corporate governance regime fashioned upon
western concepts of norm consistency and legal protection of minority shareholder rights.
Foreign Economic Advice. In its push for corporate law reform, the government
would eventually draw upon western sources of expertise. Legal commentary indicates
that the government-sponsored reform bill represents a modified version of a draft
designed by two American corporate law professors, Bernhard Black and Reiner
Kraakman. The professors themselves came forward to publish an article explaining the
novel approach of the law. In their article, the authors indicate that they helped to draft
a model statute for the Russian Federation, which formed "the basis for the recently
adopted Russian law on joint-stock companies."*^* This assessment conforms to the
normative substance of the law. As advocated by Black and Kraakman, the Russian
See Bernhard Black & Reiner Kraakman. 1996. "A Self-Enforcing Model of Corporate Law,"
109 Harvard Law Review, pp. 191 1-1982.
In their acknowledgments, the authors, however, make a reference to Anna Stanislavovna
Tarassova as "the principal Russian drafter of the Russian company law. Black et al. 1996, p. 1912.
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Company Law offers legal protection of minority shareholder rights and participation in
the governance of the corporation. Toward this end, major points of the law include; (1)
cumulative voting by shareholders to elect the board of directors; (2) extensive procedural
protections for shareholders over the board; (3) a requirement for the use of independent
registrars; (4) disclosure of a company's financial records and other relevant information;
and (5) mandatory board and shareholder oversight over classes of large-scale and self-
interested transactions.
Regarding entry and exit options, the 1996 corporate law guarantees the right of
shareholders in an open stock company to sell their shares freely. Again, a valid transfer
of shares requires registration in the company register. Furthermore, similar to previous
regulations, the law attempts to reduce control by company insiders over the register by
establishing that companies with more than 500 shareholders must transfer management
of the register to a special registry. In view of the difficulties many newly incoming
shareholders had had with registering their shares, the law provides that registration must
be conducted within three days after the necessary documents are submitted. In the event
that the registration requirements have not been met, the company must issue a written
explanation for the rejection within five days after the request for registration is
submitted. A shareholder may challenge in court a decision to refuse to register his
shares.
For a discussion of the law, see Gregory Wolk. 1999. "Comment: Corporate Governance
Reform in Russia: The Effectiveness of the 1996 Russian Company Law," Pacific Rim Law & Policy
Journal, pp.2 19-240; Natasha Ziabkina. 1999. "Rights of Shareholders in Russia: Assessing Recent Legal
Developments," International Law and Politics, Vol.30, pp.369-396.
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Corporate Governance in the New Russia
The empirical situation of corporate governance is suggestive of Soviet-type
management discretion. General directors have been quite successful in holding onto their
control, as against rank-and-file employees and outsider influences.*^” Persisting
management patterns become visible in the nature of voting procedures, executive
decision-making, and the resolution of ownership claims.
In the governance of entry options, managers have continued to exert tight control
over who buys their shares. Circumventing the law, most companies in fact do not use
independent shareholder registers; and most managers say they oppose financial
disclosure and majority ownership by an outside investor with enough capital to turn the
firm around. A "favorite tactic" of management to counter outside ownership consists in
the dilution of stock.*^* Dilution of stock denotes the circumstance when shares are issued
to "insiders," meaning enterprise managers and employees, at below market prices. To
facilitate these insider-acquisitions, cash-starved employees and staff members are
allowed to delay payment for shares until the rate of inflation has reduced the price to
practically zero. The ultimate goal of this maneuver is to encroach upon the power of
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outside shareholders while increasing those of insiders.
Insider domination is essential for management discretion since employee
ownership is protective of the status quo. Due to organizational overlaps of the Soviet
See, for example, Shleifer et al., 1996; Blasi et al., 1997; Pistor, 1997; Hendley, 1997.
TTie Economist July 24, 1999, p.64.
Most of the surveys conducted on ovmership results from privatization estimated insider
shareholdings as a percentage of all shareholdings in privatized firms to be between 65% and 70%.
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Trade regime, labor unions continue to be weakly organized and inexperienced in the
exercise of workers rights. Another reason is fear of losing their jobs if they would
attempt to vote against management in shareholders meetings. Yet another key for
management discretion is the historical respect for the head official. Challenging the
general director seems an unlikely insider strategy for collectivities that have been
exposed to decades of Soviet-style edinonachalie. As Kathryn Hendley observes in her
in-depth study of the Saratov Aviation Plant: "Their instinct was to obey orders, not to
question their legitimacy.
As a strategy, corporate executives capitalize on the risks associated with liberal
types of entrepreneurship in order to mobilize consent from labor collectivities. Talking
in front of their workers, directors have repeatedly conjured up the image of an hostile
environment, composed of organized crime and foreign investors, ready to launch a
hostile take-over of their business. Argumentative formulas, such as, "whether the
government likes it or not, the privatization program will be beneficial only to foreign
business and domestic shadow business" characterize such arguments.
Related surveys on enterprise behavior confirm that Russian corporate directors
espouse an ambivalent attitude towards the involvement of foreign investors in the
conduct of business affairs. Russian managers oppose outside minority shareholders
Hendley, Kathryn. 1998. "Struggling to Survive: A Case Study of Adjustment at a Russian
Enterprise," Europe-Asia Studies, Vol.50, No.l, pp.91-119.
Tatyana Koryagina, a former colleague of Gaidar who would later become a key economic
advisor to Gennady A. Zyuganov quoted in Joseph Blasi et al., 1997, p.46.
See Joseph Blasi et al., 1997, pp. 96-104; 1998 Russia: Country Commercial Guide, pp.24-27;
Macmillan, Carl H. 1996. "Foreign Investment in Russia: Soviet Legacies and Post-Soviet Prospects," in
Foreign Investment in Russia and Other Soviet Successor States, pp.41-73, here at pp. 65f.
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even if they would bring an inflow of capital and technological know-how necessary to
modernize enterprises: "Yes, we need investments, but we would never agree to get them
in return for our shares. We don't need anything outside shareholders have to offer. We
have not given our share register to an independent registrar and we're simply not going
to."i'^
Summarizing his research on corporate governance in Russia, Joseph Blasi came
to the following assessment:
In 1996 we gave all Russian corporations corporate governance scores based on the number of
outsiders on their boards, cumulative voting, the use of independent shareholder registrars, the
degree to which owners of concentrated blocks of stock (over 5 percent of shares) had board seats
in proportion to ownership, and maneuvering to keep new share issues and stock buybacks within
the firm. Thirteen percent of companies engaged in bad practices so systematically that their
corporate governance was graded so horrible; 46 percent received bad corporate governance
grades; and 39 percent, who engaged in only one or two questionable practices among generally
good ones, were graded as good. Two percent of the companies received excellent scores. This is
not encouraging news, since even those companies with reputations for good corporate governance
engaged in at least one practice that might make a serious outside investor think twice.
More recent trends in corporate Russia seem to indicate a change towards more
transparency. In July 1999 The Economist noted that many abuses are becoming rarer
thanks to more rigorous enforcement of stock market rules by Russia's securities and
exchange commission (SEC). The article went on to argue that, "Russian company
158
registrars can no longer simply delete the names of shareholders they dislike.
Especially larger companies are seen to be moving to comply with the law as a default
mechanism to protect shareholder rights in the hopes of attracting foreign investment.
Quoted in Blasi et al., 1997, p.l03.
Blasi et al., 1997,p.l01.
The Economist, July 24, 1999, p.64.
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Insiders at SIDANCO, a Russian oil company, for example, agreed to offer minority
shareholders "equal access" to bonds that had been previously diluted. To be sure, the
offer came after aggrieved shareholders called upon the SEC. Vladimir Potanin, director
of SIDANCO, purportedly commented on the former deal that in Russia today "it is not
possible not to respect shareholder rights.
The convoluted style of Potnanin's statement seems conspicuous in reflecting
persistent features of ambiguity in the governance of Russian business affairs. Firms
interested in attracting foreign direct investment are likely to comply with the 1996
company law, while smaller business entities continue to hold on to their accustomed way
of doing business. As a tendency, managers seem willing to comply only when they
realize they need outside money. According to field research. Corporate Russia appears to
be splitting into two tiers of corporate governance. The first tier is concerned with
attracting investments and exhibits "no major corporate governance challenges."
The second seeks to remain closed and works with closely affiliated "banks or trade
suppliers."
The aforementioned assessment corresponds with more general streams of
development in state-business relations. Observers note that Russia is undergoing a
tectonic rift in socio-political exchanges between center (Moscow & St. Petersburg) and
Chrysta Freeland. "Shareholders Win Russian Bond Fight," Financial Times (London),
February 26, 1998, p.2.
Paula Hawkins. 1997. "Salomon Gets Serious," 7 Central Eur, pp.44f (containing excerpts from
an interview with Jim Dannis, Managing Director for Emerging Markets with Salomon Bros.), as
quoted in
Gregory Wolk, 1999, p.235.
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periphery that seems to recapitulate culturally determined cleavage formation.’^’
Economic entities located at the periphery, or with an ideological outlook diverging from
that of the center, seem inclined to utilize Soviet-type trading regimes in order to
circumvent the rules of official' Russia. To erect entry barriers to outside control,
general directors rely on personalized exchange patterns established in Soviet times.
Decentralized networks of trusting business partners take the shape of financial-
industrial-groups (FIGs) and barter cartels.
A
1996 survey of 1670 industrial
enterprises, it has been revealed that 42 percent of trade was through non-monetary
exchange, including barter and payment in various forms of negotiable instruments.
Russian CEO's prefer and adopt such trading networks, even when monetary funds are
available. This business strategy seems irrational because the complexities of barter
impose a 100 percent surcharge on transaction costs. Moscow, on the other hand, with
its concentration power, emerges as the new capital of Russian-style capitalism. Data on
foreign direct investment (FDI) is indicative of center-periphery cleavage. The city makes
up six percent of Russia's population, but attracts two-thirds of FDI. All leading Russian
See, for example, Hendley, Kathryn & Barry W. Ickes, Peter Murrell, and Randi Ryterman.
1997. "Observations on the Use of Law by Russian Enterprises," Post-Soviet Affairs, Vol.l3, No.l, pp.l9-
41; Dinello (1999).
Financial-industrial-Groups represent alliances among commercial and industrial enterprises
that are connected through interlocking share holding and directorates organized along the lines of
production chains.
Hendley & Ickes et al., 1997.
Some researchers estimate that barter entails 100 percent surcharge vis-a-vis money-based
transactions; for details see Hendley et al., 1997, p.34.
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banks, the main beneficiaries of privatization, are Moscow-based; among the thirty
leading banks in January 1998 only two were located elsewhere.’^
See, for example, Dinello, 1999, p.28.
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CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSION
To draw a tentative conclusion, the present study demonstrates that post-Soviet
reform politics have been shaped by culturally specified contingencies. To assess the
degree of institutional contingency, the inquiry (1) carved out the institutional bases
pertaining to coordination and control of economic reform and (2) contextualized the
specified variables with empirical settings of corporate law reform. The analysis (3)
established in this regard a correlation between the variables of institutional arrangement
and transformative capacity. The resulting matrix of intended and unintended
consequences of corporate law reform bespeaks in this context a circumstance of endemic
low transformative capacity.
AD 1 : In accordance with the historic model, the executive branch of government
emerged to exercise tight discretion over the institutional underpinnings of reform
politics. To ensure heightened autonomy in policy design, the presidential apparatus
would make strategic institutional choices to insulate government agency from societal
interest structure. Insularity of government agency extended over both institutional
dimensions of government, inter-branch and state-societal.
Inter-branch relations. To all appearances, Boris Yeltsin stands in the current of
czarist traditions, able to condition the process of constitutional politics to his personal
advantage. The 1993 constitution, composed under his auspices, confers abundant powers
to the Presidency, allowing for the merging of legislative and executive powers. In its
push for reform, the Yeltsin regime institutionalized an operational framework that would
diminish the role of democratically elected representatives to the State Duma. Recurrent
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episodes of government reshuffling and the invocations of constitutional crisis bespeak
the scope for political maneuvering and tactical moves of the Presidency. Reminiscent of
Czanst times, furthermore, is the organizational design and status of the presidential
bureaucracy. Exceeding by far the scope of other government agencies, the Executive
Office is of central importance for the internal relations of coordination and control. Its
operational competence has been credited to be of central importance to the coordination
of legislative activity. In conjunction with the State-Legal Administration, it is considered
a gatekeeper within the field of legislation. Under the Romanov dynasty, a similar role
was accorded to the State Chancery working under the auspices of the Imperial State
Council.
State-Societal Linkages. In addition, the presidential apparatus would ensure
autonomy from societal pressures by exerting tight, if not to say manipulative, control
over the organizational design of participation and societal interaction in state-business
exchanges. To maximize control over policy choice, the Yeltsin Presidency disrupted the
established framework of state-industrial linkages and forged new coalitions based
primarily on personal discretion. To this end, Yeltsin could make use of his presidential
powers to reshape and condition societal access points. Instrumental to this cause was his
decision to disenfranchise and undercut Soviet-type mass-base organizations and to grant
particularistic entitlements for access and bargaining to a network of personal friends and
favorites. Due to Yeltsinite discretion, emerging state-business linkages manifest
organizational strains of volatility, selectivity, and informality. The analysis referred in
this context to the delicate web of "court politics" and extra-constitutional arrangements
that revolved around the Yeltsin family.
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The new Kremlin Oligarchy: Presidential discretion was instrumental in the rise of
a highly leveraged group of financial-industrial entrepreneurs, the new Kremlin
Oligarchy. The preceding paragraphs illustrated in this regard the political calculus of this
particularistic exchange relation. Based on traditional concepts of loyalty, Yeltsin was
pleased to extend bargains to friendly bankers rather than to the provincial industrialists
who are backing the Communist Party. This type of political exchange peaked with the
loans-for-shares privatization scheme instituted in 1995. To grant special privatization
rules, and exemptions from the general laws, Yeltsin made consistent use of his
presidential decree powers. The underlying rationale was to create a class of property
owners whose self-interest would depend on the continued support of the Yeltsin regime.
Culturally specified governance codes emerged in this respect through the personalized
nature of entitlement.
The analysis, however, also tried to underline the negative aspects of this
particularistic exchange modus with respect to concerns of social legitimacy and political
culture. Proximity of this oligarchic type of support group to political authority turned out
to be disastrous for state capacity and the conduct of an effective economic policy. In
contrast to its historic predecessors, the new group of Oligarchs would not bend to the
insignia of political authority when their immediate business interests were involved.
Instead, the class of nouveaux riches businessmen made it very clear that they would
exploit every means possible, including extra-constitutional arrangements, to advance
their interests. Multiple series of "media wars" demonstrated their inclination not to
support government policy and to openly resist authoritative action.
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Resistance to government authority emerged more aggressively in its opposition
to strengthened efforts of revenue collection. Under the lead of Boris Berezovsky, the
new business elite would launch a media campaign to ridicule government cooperation
with the international institution of the IMF. Capitalizing on the theme of wounded
national pride, the published press articles would question the legitimacy of IMF
involvement into the affairs of Russian reform politics. At the same time, however, the
Oligarchy would ignore its commonality with the international institution, namely the
basic fact that their own rise to power was made possible through the criticized
institutional contingency. Both oligarchic self-enrichment and evolving patterns of IMF
involvement in Russian affairs were conditional upon the institutional feature of
heightened insularity. Deriving from internal system features, the Presidency had the
strategic option to allocate and reshape bargaining positions based on tactical
considerations.
AD 2: The organizational complexities involved in the utilization of highly
insulated government agencies became clearly visible in connection with corporate law
reform. When the government took the initiative to strengthen the property rights of
minority shareholders, it became evident how difficult it would be to change embedded
social behaviors without a set of complementary institutional arrangements. The
preceding section highlighted in this respect the varieties of Soviet-type continuities in
the affairs of corporate governance. Voting procedures, executive decision-making, and
the resolution of ownership claims bespeak the persistence of Soviet-type
management
discretion. As a corollary, the current situation suggests that domestic general
directors
have the freedom of choice on whether or not to comply with the
1996 legislation.
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According to available data, managers are willing to comply only when they realize that
they need outside money. On the basis of the presented material, however, it seems fairly
reasonable to argue that even the influx of outside investment capital does not guarantee
compliance. Recurrent cases of share dilution have made it clear that Russian managers
have been very reluctant to adapt to western standards of business conduct. Common to
these developments is that general directors have quite successfully maintained the status
quo. The pertinent research literature emphasizes the phenomenon of insider-domination.
In addition, emerging patterns of center-periphery cleavages provide another
strong indicator of low transformative capacity. Corporate Russia appears to be
undergoing a tectonic rift in socio-political exchanges. Economic entities located at the
periphery, or with an ideological outlook diverging from that of the center, seem more
inclined to utilize Soviet-type trading regimes. Indicative of this tendency is the structure
of FDI and the mushrooming of barter cartels organized along Soviet lines of production
chains. Russia, consequently, runs the risk of having two opposing realms of governance,
the Moscow-based centralized economic interests involving the new Oligarchy of come-
to-riches businessmen, on the one hand, and decentralized actors without access to the
Kremlin's 'inner circle,' on the other. The developing patterns of two disassociated
governance structures and realms of influence bears in this context a stunning
resemblance to Robert Tucker's paradigmatic conception of Russia as a dual cultural
entity.
AD 3: The presented materials demonstrate that regime failure to change
embedded social behaviors is connected to the organizational design of state-societal
relations. Low organizational density and executive branch domination of societal input
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options have certainly left their mark on the sociological field of economic reform. The
data of unintended consequences of reform policy bespeaks an organizational dearth of
information exchanges and guidance in understanding reform policy. The fact that
corporate executives are in a position to mobilize worker collectivities to act against their
own self-interests by not observing their legal rights in the governance of the corporation
underscores such reasoning. Particularly troublesome is the phenomenon that Russian
managers are evidently able to capitalize on culturally established fears of xenophobia.
Such conditions certainly underscore the issue of information dearth because the legal
clause of minority shareholder protection, as stipulated under the 1996 legislation, is
designed to serve equally the needs of worker collectivities and any outside investors
(domestic or foreign). To be sure, under current conditions it seems fairly easy for
insider-controlled firms to question the legitimacy of reform policy. The intertwining of
the Presidency with a network of personal friends and favorites, the new Kremlin
Oligarchy, which itself does not appear inclined to comply with the general legislation of
economic reform policy, is certainly not helpful in inducing a change at the political and
regional periphery. In addition, the fact that the Russian government was, to a certain
extent, dependent upon foreign economic advice in shaping policy also plays into the
hands of resisting sociological structures. Accordingly, business collectivities have
rejected the new legislation because of culturally determined concerns, or interpret it
simply as new machinations of the power center. The provision of an acceptable
alternative to traditional Russian-style transformation could have lessened these concerns.
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